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ABSTRACT 
The p urpose of thi s paper is critically to review two -ujor
appr oa ches to the analysis of agrarian societies and to do so in l ight 
of ev i dence taken from Africa . 
The first approa ch posits the existence of "natural" societies ; 
the s e cond, "p easant" societies. Both approa che s attribute 
psychological and institutional character i st i c s  to these societies.  
When s ubject t o  the exogenous shock s of intrusive political and 
econom ic force s, these attributes  then generate characterist i c  patterns 
of change. The exi stence of such "pre-cap italist "  societies i s  thus 
often invoked t o  account for patterns of change in contemporary rural 
societies .  
On  the  basis of  African materia l s ,  the paper argues that these 
app r oa ches are ov erly cultural. They are ov erly e conom i st ,  under-
valuing the importance of the state. Many of the so-called p r e-
cap ital i st features of the se societies are them selves arguably product s  
o f  their encounter w ith agent s  of cap ital ism. Moreover, many result
from the eff ort s of states  to secure domination and control ov er rural 
populat ions . 
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Sweet smil ing v i l lage , lov e liest of the lawn, 
Thy sport s are tled,  and a l l  thy charms withdrawn; 
Amidst thy bowers the tyrant ' s  hand is seen, 
And desolation saddens all thy green : 
One only master grabs the whole domain , 
And half a v illage st int s  thy smil ing p l ain. 
* * * 
Far , far away thy chil dren leav e the land. 
Ill fares the land , to hastening ill a prey , 
Where wealth accumul ate s ,  and men decay : 
Princes and lor ds may flourish, or may fa de; 
A breath can make them, as a breath has made : 
B ut a bold peasantry, their country's pride, 
When once de stroyed, can never be supp l ied.  
* * * 
But now the sounds of population fail.  
No cheerful murmurs fluctuate in the gal e ,  
N o  busy steps the grass-grown foot-way trea d, 
For all  the bloomy flush of life is fled. 
All but yon widowed ,  solitary thing, * 
That feebly bends be side the plashy spring . 
* O l iver Goldsmith, ,.l'he De serted V il lage" in Selected Work s of
O l iver Goldsmith ( London : MacMillan and Co. , 1920) , pp . 358-360
Permit me to ins cribe this Poem to you. 
How far you may be p l eased with the versification and mere 
mechanical parts of thi s attempt , I do not pretend to 
inquir e ;  but I know you w il l  object (and indeed sever al of 
our best and w i sest friends concur in thi s op inion) that the 
depop ulation it dep l ore s i s  no where to be seen, and the disorders 
it lament s  are only to be found in the poet's own imagination. To 
this I can scarcely mak e any ither answer than that I sincerely 
bel ieve what I hav e wr itten.
* 
** Oliver Gol dsmith, "To Sir Jo shua Reynolds , " letter transmitting 
"The De serted Village" to Sir Joshua Reyno l ds , in Se lected Work s of 
O l iver Goldsmith, p. 355 . 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of thi s paper is criti cally to review two major 
approaches to the ana lysi s of agrarian societie s  and to do so in light 
of evidence taken from Africa. The African data provoke consi derable 
skepticism con cerning the vali dity of the se cont emp orary orthodoxies 
and support three major counter argument s :  
1 .  The r ei gning orthodoxies posit the exi stence of two forms of 
agrarian societies. In some cases, the se societies are classi fied as  
"natural" societies ; in other s ,  they are classi fied as  "pea sant". In 
both cases,  they are hel d  t o  be pre-capita list. A major thesi s of this 
e s say is that thi s  last contention i s  fal se. For the very trait s that 
l ea d  these soci eties  to be classified as pre-capitalist - e.g. the 
exi stence of common land  right s ;  the avoidan ce of market exchanges ; the 
turning to subsi stence production, reciprocity and such social 
in stitution s as the family sy stem for economi c support - are them selves 
arguably product s of the encounter of agrarian societie s  with agents of 
capitalism. 1 
2. A s econd argument i s  that the current orthodoxies are 
ov erly cultural. The orthodox position s tend  t o  ac count for agrarian 
in stitutions in terms of the values of rural dw eller s ,  e.g. their 
desire to secure subsi sten ce or to gain social stan ding. Thi s  e s say 
in stead argue s that key agrarian in stitutions repre sent compromises and 
a daptations; equa lly as often, they represent impo sition s from above by 
more powerful external agent s. In either case,  agrarian in stitution s 
cannot represent in stitutionalized expres sion s of agrarian value s and 
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subje ctivi st , value-based a ccount s of these in stitution s are therefore 
false.  
3. A third criti ci sm i s  that the prevailing theories are
ov erly economist. In particular, they ten d to un der-value the 
importance of the state. Many of the distin ctive in stitutions o f  
a grarian societi e s ,  I argue, result from the effort s  o f  the state t o  
secure domination an d control over rural population s ;  and many o f  the 
behavior s attributed to the preferen ce s  of rural dwellers result from 
strategi c interactions with public agencies  which seek to extract goods 
an d services from them. In sofar as  the in stitution s and behaviors 
exhibited by agrarian societies define a peasantry, in short , state s 
create peasant s .  
INTRODUCING THE DOMINANT ORTHODOX IES 
Amon g the most prominent of the current approa ches ,  two stan d 
out : the "natural " and "peasant" economy models of rural society. 
The se models contain both stati c and dynami c el ements. The fir st 
provide the initial condition s and the defining in stit utional and 
behavioral characteri sti cs ;  when linked, the se static element s generate 
characteri sti c pattern s of change and signi ficant implications f or 
publi c p o li c y. 
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The Myth of the Natural Economy 
The critical elem ents o f  the model o f  the natural economy are 
present ed in table 1 .  In this section, I elaborate upon this schematic 
suDDllari zation . 
The origins of this model lie widely scatter e d .  The model 
derives as much from Polanyi as from Marx and Engels ; 2 its roots stem
as well from Tonnies notion of societies based upon the principles of 
gem einschaft, and from Maine's notion of societies based upon status . 3 
In more recent times, the model has been advanced by Dalton, Wol f, 
Migdal, and Scott, writers whose works have been grouped by their 
principal critic, Samuel Popkin, into the "moral economy" school of 
social analysis . 4 
Initial Conditions: According to the model of the natural 
economy, "primitive" agrarian societies produce not for exchange but 
for use; as a consequence 
market exchanges are usually peripheral, in the sense that most 
sellers do not acquire the bulk of their livelihood, and buyers 
the bulk of their daily used goods and services, via 
market-place sales and purchases • •  
• labor and land do not 
enter the market and basic livelihood is acquir ed in non-market 
spheres • • • all important output and factor flows are carried on 
via reciprocity and redistribution . 5 
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TABLE 1 
Schematic Presentation of the Model of a Natural Economy 
Initial Conditions: 
i .  Agrarian econom y .  
ii. Production for use rather than exchange. 
iii . Insignificance of markets . 
Institutional Characteristics: 
i .  "Connnunal" land rights; 
a. Use rights accorded to producers if and only if 
producer a member of the coDD11unity . 
b. Rights to land revert to community when use rights 
no longer exercised . 
ii . Importance of the primary community and, in particular, 
the village . 
Behavioral Characteristics: 
i .  The desire for sel f-su fficiency .  
ii . The importance of status . 
iii . The importance of equality .  
Patterns o f  Change: 
i .  Initial opposition to "commoditization." 
ii . Social disintegration in the face of markets . 
iii . R adicalization un der the impact of capitalism . 
Corollaries: 
The preference of agrarian societies for communal forms of 
economic organization . 
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In the absence of market s, resource s  are not allocate d  in accord with 
their value in exchange ; rather, the patterns of allocation are 
determined by social r e lationships. As Dalton state s, 
Specifical ly, these primitive social econom ies are so organized 
that the allocat ion of labour and land, work organization w ithin 
productive p roce s se s, and t he disposition of goods and services -
in short, produ ct ion and di stribut ion - are expres s ions of 
underly ing kinship obl igation, tribal affil iat ion, and rel igious 
and moral duty. There is no separate econom ic system to be 
ana lyzed independent ly of social organization. 6 
Inst itut ional Characteri stics : Nowhere is the determining 
inf luence of social organization over the al location of econom ic 
r e sources more clea r ly seen than in the area of prop erty right s. In 
pre-capital ist societies, according t o  Marx, 
in all the se form s, • • •  landed property and agriculture are the 
ba sis of  the e co nom ic order and • • •  the econom ic object ive is 
• • •  the p r o du ct ion of u s e- v a l ue s, i. e. the reprodu ct ion o f  the 
individual7 
Under such cir cum stance s, "an isolated indiv idua l cou l d  no more own 
land than he could speak.118 The acquis ition of property is thus a 
social act; it requi res m embership in a community. As Marx concludes 
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in his di s cuss ion of the Germanic form of pre-capitalist society - a 
di s cuss ion which is far more appl icable to the analysis of African 
so cieties than is  his more widely cited dis cus s ion of the As iati c  form 
- "property therefore means be longing to a tribe .... 119 
Criti cal t oo i s  the imp ortance of face-to-face communiti e s, 
and, in part icular, the village. Along w ith kin-based organizations, 
v il lages are viewed as the central social institution of agrarian 
societies. The importance of the vil lage is perhap s best suggested by 
Scott : 
In a lmost every case [ in Southeast Asia] the vil lage has 
constituted something more than merely a physical aggregation of 
households. Ritually, it has been set apart by local guardian 
spi rit s and religious shrines ; economical ly, it has r epresented 
the unit of  labor exchange ; social ly, it has formed the unit of  
stat us, of reciprocity, and of social insurance ; political ly, it 
has generally been a unit of dispute settlement, as well  as of 
administration and taxation.lo
The vil lage is central to all  aspect s  of rural l ife. 
Communal restrictions on landed property and the pervasiv e  
signif icance of village s :  both underscore the impact o f  social 
r elations on econom i c  l ife. In the l iterature on the natural e conomy 
and in the l iterature on the peasant economy as well - the two themes  
are  often fused; they combine in the dis cus s ion of  the corporate 
village. In the w ords of Wolf,  such vil lages 
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maintain a measure of communal jur i s dict ion over land • • •
r e strict their membership , maintain a r e l igious sy stem, enforce 
mechani sms which insure the redistribut ion or destruction of 
s urplus wealth, and uphold barriers against the • • •  out s i de 
1 1  
And whi l e  the initial writings of Wolf  make it clear that the corporate 
vil lage is but one of many form s of rural settl ement ,  the analysis of 
these vil l age s dominates much of the subsequent l iterature on agrarian 
society.12 
So cia l Value s :  The so cial inst itut ions of rural society, this 
l it erature contends, facilitate the attainment of key cultural values. 
One such value i s  a sense of membership. As Dalton states,  "In 
pr imitive communities, the individual as an e conomic factor i s  
p er sona l ized, not anonymous. H e  tends t o  h o l d  h i s  economic position in 
virtue of his social position.111 3  Another is a stress  on equal ity. A 
third is an out growth of the f ir st two:  the  value p laced on guarantees 
of sub s i stence. Each member of society possesses an equal right t o  
suffici ent income to guarantee their survival. Thus Scott , in his  
di s cuss ion of agrarian institutions, cites  Polanyi and states : 
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Polanyi claims on the ba sis of historical and anthropological 
e v i dence that • p r a ct i c e s  • • •  in t r a dit i ona l  s o c i ety • 
served to mark it off from the modern economy. He concluded, 
"It is the absence of threat of individual starvation which 
makes  primitive society, in a sense, more humane than market 
economy, and at the same time less  econom ic.1114
Transition Arguments :  The model of the natural e conomy thus 
posit s  dist inctive inst itut ional and subj ective features for agrarian 
societies. It posit s  as well a notion of change. The initial 
condition of the natural economy is the absence of markets. But ,  
accor ding t o  this mode l ,  market s inevitably penetrate int o  even the 
most i solated communit ies ; and this alteration in the initial 
conditions generate s  chara cteristic patterns of change. 
One response is t o  res ist the market ; in the w or ds of Redfield, 
these societies attempt to keep the market "at arm's lengtb.111 5  With
the inev itable triumph of the market, however, there arises a second 
respon s e :  social di s integration. In the words of Wolf, "cap italism cut 
through the integument of cust om, severing people from their accustomed 
social mat rix in order to transform them int o  e conom ic a ctors, 
independent of pr ior social commitment s  to kin and neighbors.1116 "This
l iberation from accust omed social ties and the separation which it 
entailed constituted the hist or i cal experience which Kar l  Marx woul d 
describe in terms of 'alienation',11 1 7  The third response is rural
radica l i sm. Agrarian protest is radical, it is held, in the sense that 
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it assert s the entitl ement o f  all people t o  s ubsi stence, the validity 
of communal property as a means of se curing thi s entit lem ent, and the 
r ejection of the private market. As Wolf states in hi s analysi s of 
rural revoluti ons, 
In a sense  a l l  our • • •  ca s e s  can be s e e n  a s  t h e  o ut com e of 
defensive r ea ctions, coup le d  with a search for a new and more 
humane social order.1 8
And a s  Scott states, 
As the growth of commerce and markets • • •  broke the hold of 
local cust om, the utopian vision of the pea santry increasingly 
anti cipated a soci ety in whi ch, as in ear lier times, ·�uying and 
selling" would di sappear.1 9
The result i s  rural radi ca lism : 
it is preci s e ly the fact that p easant s  and arti sans hav e one foot 
in the pre-capitali st economy that explains w hy they have provi de d 
the mass impetus for so many "forward looking" movement s. Their 
opposition to capitali sm, based as it i s  on a utopian image of an 
earlier era, is as tenacious, if not more so, as the oppo siti on of 
a prol etariat which has both feet in the new society.20 
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Policy Correlates : The ethi cal propertie s  of the natural 
economy, it i s  held, render rural dwe l lers revoluti onary not only in 
their political but also in their economic behavior. An important 
corollary of thi s theory is that rural dweller s  wil l  subscribe t o  
collective form s o f  e conomi c organization, ones which r eject private 
property and thereby forestall the emergence of economic inequality and 
exploitation. As noted by Hyden, the promotion of cooperative 
soci eti es in Afri ca derives in part from the convi cti on that Afri can 
rural society is by preference communitarian:  
Like Russian populi st s  in the nineteenth century Afri can leaders 
have i dealized the ''p ure" features  of p ea sant society. "Africa is 
es sentially 'communaucrati c', write s  Sekou Toura 'We had a lready 
r ealized sociali sm before the coming of the Europeans,' says 
Leop o l d  Senghor. 21
In response to these convictions, political lea ders such as Toure, 
Senghor, Kaunda, Nyerere and others proceeded to form cooperative 
societi es and channe led their program s of agricultural development 
through the cooperative movement.22
The Peasant Economy : 
A second model of agrari an soci ety is frequently app lied to 
rural Afri ca : the model of the peasant society. It s di stinctive 
features are summari zed in table 2. 
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TABLE 2 
S chematic Presentation of the Model of a Peasant Society 
Init ial Conditions : 
i. Post-agrarian e conomy ; the importance of urban industry and 
manufa cturing.
i i. Fully elaborated markets  both for product s and factors of 
production. 
iii . Production for exchange as wel l as use .  
Inst itut ional Characteristics : 
i .  Private rights in land. 
ii. Prevalence of inequal ity : 
a. The importance of state coer cion.
b. The imp ortance of cla s s  forma tion.
i ii. Lim ited participation in the markets  for product s and 
labor.  
Behavioral Assumpt ions : 
i. Subs istence eth i c .
ii.  Rejection of p ure profit maximization. 
Patterns of Change : 
i. The creat ion of the peasant mode : the impact of cap ital i sm 
on the natural e conomy . 
ii. Conflict s between peasant mode and capitalism.
Initial Conditions : Peasant socie tie s are hel d to be pre-
capital i st in the sense that in peasant societies labor is not 
separated from the means of production. Nonetheless,  it is contended, 
peasant societies represent a more "advanced" form of agrarian society 
than do natural economies. Peasant socie ties do not stand isolated and 
self-suf f icient ; rather , they res i de w ithin state systems and within 
e conomies which contain cities, industry and manufacturing. And they 
are l inked to these other social sectors through relations of pol itical 
domination and economic exchange. 
Institut ional Characteristics:  Nearly all di scussions of 
pea sant societie s thus emphas ize that pea sant socie ties are "part-
societies. " As Kroeber's classic  definition states, 
Peasants are def initely rural - yet l ive in relation to market 
towns ; they form a class segment of a larger population which 
us ual ly contains urban centers, some time s metropol itan capitals. 
They constitute part-so cieties w ith part-cultures.23
In the cul tural sphere, peasants are bearers of the "l it tle" tradition ; 
they del:ine their ritua l s  in response to the "great" tradition of the 
ritual centers of the larger society.24 In the pol itical sphere, they
are part of but not governor s of the pol itical system ; as Shanin 
state s ,  
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Peasant s ,  a s  a ru l e, h av e  been k ept a t  arm's l en gth f r om th e 
sources of pow er. Their politica l  subj ect i on interl ink s w ith 
cultural subordination and with their exp l oitation. • • •  25
N ot only are pea sant s  polit ical ly subordinate t o  the state,  but also 
they are politically dom inated by other clas ses; often these are rural 
classe s,  for in the context of a market economy and w ith the help of 
state power certain fragment s  of the rural society are able to 
accumulate large- s ca l e  private landholdings. So important i s  the 
pattern of inequal ity that Welch is dr iven to a sk :  "W ithout landlor ds,  
could there be peasant s?1126
In the econom ic sphere, peasant s  are "part-" societies in the 
sense that they participate in market s and are rel iant upon them t o  
ful fill  their sub s i stence needs, but they a r e  only partially so. As 
Wolf states, "We may • • •  draw a l ine between the pea sant and another 
agricultural type whom we cal l  the 'farmer.' The farmer v iew s 
agriculture as a bu sine s s  enterprise • • • •  The aim of the pea sant i s  
subsistence.1127 And a s  Fal ler s  comment s,  "In e conom ic t erm s,  a peasant 
i s  • • •  a man who p r o du c e s  • • •  ma inly f o r  h i s  ow n h ou s eh o l d' s  
consumpt ion, but who a l so produ ces someth ing t o  exchange in a market 
for other goods and serv ices. This is the e conom i c  aspect of the 
peasant c ommunity's sem i-autonomy.1128 The l im ited parti cipation in the
market is seen both in the tendency to consume large proportions of 
one's own produ ct ion and a l so to rely primarily upon fam ily, as opposed 
t o  hired, labor. 
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Behavioral Characterist ics : Further def ining peasant society 
are behav ioral and psychological characterist i cs. Chayanov , for 
examp l e  argues  that the economics of the peasant hou sehold differ from 
that of a profit maximiz ing f irm , for peasant s  are driven by the need 
to secure sufficient su bsistence to guarantee their surv ival and their 
r eprodu ct ion. Pea sant s  will  therefore incur cost s up t o  the point 
where the consumpt ion needs of the domestic e conomy are satisfied. As 
a consequence , pea sant s  will,  if nece s sary, engage in "internal 
exp l oitation" of fam ily labor to cover the r equirement s  of domestic 
consumpt ion. Dr iven by the imperative of supporting the dom e st i c  unit, 
pea sant s  w i l l  work longer hours,  cultivate more intensiv e ly the lands 
they hold or surrender greater revenues for lands they w i sh to buy than 
purely commer cial consi derations wou l d  justify.29
Becaus e  their households are more than a pure produ ct ion unit, 
then, pea sant s  are motivated by principles  other than tho s e  of prof it 
maxim ization. Joining Chayanov in thi s  argument are others who ext end 
the range of r elevant motivat ions to include social goal s. According 
to thi s  position, the pea sant expends the fruit s  of produ ct i on to bu ild  
close  and support ive ties  with his  fellow rural dwellers. Thi s  is 
w i se, it i s  argued, because the market i s  r i sky and uncertain;  the 
support of others i s  required as a form of social insurance. As Wolf 
states,  ''To insure continuity upon the l and and sustenance form his 
hou sehold, the pea sant most often keep s  the market at arm's l ength, for 
unl imited involvem ent in the market threatens his  hold on h i s  source of 
l ivelihood. He thus cleaves to traditional arrangement s  whi ch 
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guarantee  his  access t o  land and t o  the labor o f  kin and neighbors.',JO
Moreover, exp enditures upon social invol vement s  are inh erent ly 
enjoyabl e and r ewarding ; for the culture of the peasant ry s imp ly places 
a high er prior ity on social status than on material wealth. These 
themes are captured by Routh, who i s  quoted w ith approval by Goran 
Hyden ; accor ding to Routh, the peasant 
e at s w e l l ,  h e  h a s  a be d t o  s l e ep on,  a ch a i r  to s it on. F o r  
r e creation, h e  has h i s  evenings o f  conversation round the pombe 
(beer) pot. There is no f igure in the econom ic textbooks which i s  
m or e  m i s un de r st o o d  than h e  • • • •  To s ug g e st that h e  i s  
"underempl oyed" a n d  imagine that one i s  bestowing a favour on h im 
by providing more work, is ludicrous. It is his a im t o  be a s  
underemployed as possible, and t o  a llow himself to b e  disturbed 
from thi s aim only by the nee d  to meet his  austere obj e ct ives.3 1
The static component s o f  the model o f  a peasant economy thus 
contain a set of initial condit ions (an a dvanced market economy) , 
inst itut ional trait s (rural class format ion, pol itical subordination, 
and partial involvement in markets ) ,  and behavioral characteristics (an 
overri ding concern w ith subsistence and w ith the primary community). 
The dynamic components consist of patt erns of change, patterns wh ich 
include both the origins and the de struction of the pea sant economy. 
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Patterns of Change : The origins of peasant society, it is 
held, l ie in the impact of market forces upon the natural economy. 
Under the stimu lation of the market , property rights become 
individual istic ;  households no longer are self-suff icient but become 
dependent on the market ; and "sel f-sufficient communities founded 
l argely upon kinship t i es are 'turned outwards,' as it w ere, and made 
dependent • • • upon external structures and forces.•,32 In the third
w or l d, the primary agency for thi s  expansion of the market is the 
imp erial state; as Post contends 
The colonial powers • • •  greatly extended the market principle, 
t o  the point where the impersonal forces of the world market 
dom inated the l ives of mill ions, and imposed a State where none 
h a d  been bef o r e ,  or t o  s up e r s e de ind igenou s o ne s  • • • •  It would  
appear, then, that many of  the conditions for the existence of  a 
pea santry were suddenly created, but from the out s i de.33
The intrus ion of cap ita l i st society, championed by the powers of 
imp erial expansion, thus lead to the alterations of the conditions 
support ive of the natural economy and promoted the formation of a 
p ea sant society, in which pre-cap italist forms (workers in control of 
their own means of product ion) cont inue d to operate, but w ithin a fully 
cap ita l i st exchange economy. 
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The dynam ic element s  o f  the model posit a s  w e l l  the existence 
of a se cond set of change s :  patterns of tension and conflict between 
the peasant mode of production and cap itali sm, 
For some, such as Hyden, the contradict ory relations between 
the cap itali st and p re-cap italist modes of production is suggested by 
the apparent conv ict ion that the existence of the peasantry retar ds the 
growth of cap ital i sm. For according t o  Hyden, the p ea sant's capacity 
to revert back to subsi stence al lows the peasantry to prevent the 
extract ion of s urp lus from an agrarian e conomy. As Hyden write s :  
it i s  not an exaggeration t o  claim that the p r incipal struct ural 
constraint to development are the barriers raised , • , by the 
peasant mode of production. , In or der to appropriate the 
s urplus product from the peasant more effect ively there is no 
other way avai lable but to raise peasant productivity and make h im 
produce more than for his  own domestic needs.34
For others, such as W i l l iam s, the tension between the pea santry and 
cap italism also exi st s ,  but will  nonetheless inevitably be resolve d ;  
for the peasant s  a r e  viewed a s  a n  inherent ly "transitional class,  which 
w ill inevitably be displaced by the technical superiority of cap italist 
production. They are able to sustain their existences in the face of 
, • , competition only by overworking and imp overi shing them selves. 
In this way, they serve th e interest s  of cap ital by selling commodities 
cheap ly.1135 The very capacity for internal exp loitation inh erent in
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peasant societies thus l eads t o  the transfer o f  resources t o  the non­
agrarian sect or of society and to the self- de struct ion of the peasantry 
as a class. Driven by their own impoverishment ,  they become work ers in 
cities or on the hol dings of more efficient , large-s cale farm s, For 
others, such as Wolf and Migdal, the struggle is short-l ived; for 
accompany ing the dynam ics posited by William s are the pres sures of 
accel erated pop ulation growth and ecological str e s s  - pressures which 
lead to the immi seration and defeat of the rural society.3 6
THE MODELS CRITIQUE D IN LIGHT O F  THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
In outl ine form,  then, these are two of the dom inant m odel s of 
rural society. What is devastating i s  how poorly these models p erform 
when app l ied to the African data, 
The Init ial Conditions : 
To an Africanist, one of the most striking def i ci encies in 
these theorie s is their initial conditions : a w orld of subsistence 
production in which there are no market s, no buying, no trading, This 
assumption, it should be stressed, i s  not benign ; it cannot be 
dism issed as a mere romantic overtone in the argument. Rather, it 
prov ide s an es sential underp inning, The initial condit ions mot ivate 
the dynam ics of both the model s. Movement s  away from these conditions 
pre cip itate a change from a subsistence oriented, egal itarian, and 
isolate d agrarian society to a market dependent, class driven, pea sant 
society, inextricably tied to centers of wealth and power, And the 
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f urther intensification of r elations w ith cap italism yields a sustained 
pattern of conflict between the cap ita l i st and peasant e conom ies. The 
init ial conditions also h elp t o  account for the growth and beh avior of 
r evolut ionary force s :  outrage at the loss o f  a "state o f  virtue" 
provides the demand for r evolution and the moral values which are 
threatened through the spread of cap ital ism provide it s ideology. 
W ithout the assumptions concerning the initial conditions, then s everal 
major predict ions - concerning the r i se of class ba sed, peasant 
societies  from subsistence e conomies ; the intensification of struggle 
between pea sant s  and the a dvanced cap italist sector s  of society ; and 
the o ut br eak and nature of pea sant r evolt s - s imp ly woul d not follow. 
The initial conditions of the model of the natural economy are 
therefore critical to the preva il ing orthodoxies concerning the 
dynam ics of agrarian change. Were these condit ions t o  hold anywhere, 
one would expect them t o  hold in Africa. And yet,  t ime and time again, 
h i stor i cal resear ch reaf f irm s that in pre-colonial Afri ca there was 
trade, there was commer ce, and there was th e w i de sprea d use of money in 
exchange e conom ies. It is Jack Goody who best summarizes  these 
f indings ,  and he is worth quoting at length : 
The concept of non-monetary economics is hardly app l icable to pre­
col onial Africa, except pos s ibly for certain hunting group s of 
m inimal importance. Africa was involved in a vast network of 
w ide-ranging trade long before the Portuguese came on the s cene. 
For East Africa we have a l ate f irst century sailor's guide ,  the 
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Periplus of the Erythrean Sea, to the trade along the coast. Long 
before the Eur opeans arrived there were trade routes from 
Madagas car up to the East African coast, through the Red Sea and 
int o  the Mediterranean, along the Persian Gulf to India, Southeast 
Asia, and Indone s ia. By the t ime the Portuguese had reached East 
Africa, the Chine se had already been active ther e ;  before the 
development of the gun-carrying sailing ship on the Atlantic 
seaboard, the maritime commer ce of the Indian Ocean made western 
Europe seem an underdeveloped area. Indeed, the trade between 
Ethiopia, the Mediterranean, and the Indian Ocean had much to do 
with the development s  in the Arabian peninsula, including the rise 
of Muhamme� 
In West Africa the medieval empires of the Niger bend 
were built up on the trade which brought salt , cloth, and beads 
south from the Sahara across to West Africa and took gold and 
ivory and slaves back to the Barbary coast and from there into 
medieval Europe. 37
From the point of view of the mercantile economy, part s 
of Africa were similar to Western Europe of the same period. 
Metal coinage was in use on the East African coast. In the west, 
currencies consisted of gol d, brass,  and salt, but more especially 
cowrie shel l s ,  whi ch,  coming a s  they did from the Maldive Islands 
off the south of Ceylon, f illed most of the neces sary attributes 
of money.38 
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I solation ,  subsis ten ce, lack of involvement in an exchan ge 
economy : these are not to be foun d  in the "primitive" e conom ies of 
Africa. Alternatively, these trait s chara cterize so sma l l  an d 
in sign if icant a gro up of Afri can societies that it woul d be non sen sical 
to base a general theory of social change upon them. G iven the 
val idity of these cr iticisms on the bas i s  of African material s, the 
implication s  f or the use of these models el s ewhere is far more 
damaging. For elsewhere the pervasiveness  of the money economy has 
s ur e ly been greater an d of even lon ger durat ion. 
Tran sition Argument s  
The reign in g  orthodoxies in the st udy o f  agrarian econom ies are 
defined not only in terms of their in itial con dit ion s; they are also 
def ined in terms of their dynamics, i.e. their a ss er tion s  concerning 
characteristic pattern s of change. 
For the f ir st of these models,  the dynam ics derive from the 
pre-capitalist nature of rural society. Agrarian societies are 
portrayed as locked in confl ict w ith a powerful alternative economy : 
the capitalist econ omy, where there exists private proper ty, where 
everything can be bought and sold, an d where peop l e  are driven to 
maximize profits by the impera tive of market competition. In the face 
of the encroa chmen t of the money economy, rural dw e l ler s  are held to 
attempt to "keep the market at arm's len gth" an d to ''resist 
commoditization ."  
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In l ight of the expe cta tion s  generated by these argumen t s ,  it 
is ther efor e  disconcerting to f in d  that in Africa the roles  of the 
supposed combatan t s  are somet ime s the r everse of what thi s model would 
expect. It is sometimes the agen cies of cap ital ism - the colonial 
state - who take the lead in r e si stin g  commoditization an d in promoting 
communal  in st itution s. The advocates for the rap id expan sion of the 
market an d of private property, on the other han d, are somet imes drawn 
from the members of the indigenous agrarian society. 
" Buying an d Sel l ing" : Desp ite myths to the con trary, 
throughout much of Africa, in digenous peop l e s  turned quickly, 
vigorously, an d s kill fully to production for colonial market s. The 
rapid  an d astonishing growth of the cocoa industry in West  Africa has 
been told by Hill an d Barry; within a generation ,  Ghana became the 
world' s  l ea ding producer of cocoa and did so on the in itiative of 
indigenous agrarian intere sts.39 Hogen dorn has shown how in Northern
Nigeria indigenous entrepreneurs organized the large-sca l e  production 
of groun dn ut s  for export to colonial market.40 Similar histories exi st
for palm oil production in Nigeria and groundnut production in 
Senegal.41 Similarly, Arrighi wrote for the Rhodesia s :
It i s  pos sible that in the 1 890s the Afri can peoples  showed some 
"unfam il iarity" with [market] opportun ities,  but by the turn of 
the century this was no longer the case, Prior to 1 904 European 
farmin g in Rhodesia was in significant an d the African peasan try 
supp l ied the bulk of the foodstuffs r equired by the mines. In 
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1903 , for exampl e ,  it was e st imate d that the annual amount 
rece ived by Africans for sale of grains, other produce, and stock 
was  on the or der of 1>350 ,000, and there is much evidence that 
trade w ith the Afri can population was at the time the m ost , if not 
the only, profitable act iv ity carried out by the E uropeans. 
Further, when the development of European m ixed farming and 
ranching created a demand for Afri can-owned catt le, Afri cans were 
ready to sell them in large numbers. Though mainly l im it e d  to the 
sale of what may be call e d  "tradit ional} produce (grain, catt le, 
and beer ) ,  African participation in the produce market also t ook 
other form s :  the production f or the market of green vegetables, 
potatoe s, wheat, groundnut s ,  and t obacco, for exampl e ,  was either 
introduced or expanded, and the practice developed in the m ining 
areas of draw ing a r egular income from hiring o ut bul locks to the 
m ine s for purpo ses of  transport.42 
Arrighi goes on to note that change was not l im ited t o  the sphere of 
exchange but also was introduced in the methods of production : 
"Afri cans wer e  equa l ly prompt in investing and innovating in response 
t o  market opportunities.1143 They a cquired wagons, cart s ,  ma ize mills, 
p ump s ,  ox-drawn p loughs and other equipment ,  and they invest e d  in 
higher grade cattle and the fencing and dip s r equired for their 
surviva1. 44 
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Property Rights : In fact, change went even deeper : it 
extende d as well to the def inition of property rights. In l ight of the 
expectations formed by the orthodox treatment of agrarian change, the 
stunning irony of the matter is that it was often the government s of 
the colonial power s  - the primary agent s  of cap ital i sm - who a dvocat e d  
"communal" property r ight s whereas the members of the indigenous 
agrarian societie s often champ ioned the cause of private ownership. 
As no subject engenders greater confusion than that of property 
right s ,  let me quick ly recal l the definition out l ine d in table 1 .  By 
communal land r ight s ,  I mean a system wherein 
1 .  Use right s are accorded a producer i f  and only i f  that 
producer is a member of a community. In other w ords,  
a) Community membership is a sufficient condit ion for
r ights to land; no member of the community can go
without land. And
b) Community membership is a ne cessary condit ion for 
r ight s t o  land;  land cannot be alienated out side of
the community . 
2. The community holds revisionary rights in land. That is,
when use i s  no longer being made of land, right s t o  the
land revert to the community. The land can then be re­
allocated for use . 
Under a system of private property right s, condition 1 does not hold. 
Member ship of the community is no longer sufficient to guarantee access 
t o  land; nor is it a ne ces sary condition, and land can be alienated t o  
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persons outside the community. Moreover, land which is not in use does 
not revert to the community;  it can be hel d f or purposes of 
s pe culation, tran s ferred to other private individuals, or bequeathed to 
persons of the owner's own choosing. A clear implication of this 
system, of cour s e, i s  that even in the pre sence of abundant land, 
people can starve for want of acce s s  t o  i t ;  a primary attraction of the 
communal sy stem is that under similar circum stances such dea ths would 
not occur. 
Conf li ct s between capitalist governm ent s, committed to communal 
right s, and s poke smen for agrarian societies, committed to private land 
rights, broke out in both West and East Africa. In 1 91 2, the British 
colonial government appointed the West African Lands Committee to 
investigate land laws in Briti sh West Africa. The Committee's report 
cal led for the reinfor cement of "pure native tenure." It stressed that 
"l egislation should have as its  aim the che cking of the progress  of  
indivi dual t enure and the s trengthening of native custom, " which, it  
hel d, "di d  not reco gnize the concept of  individual tenure and forbade 
the 
• • •  s a l e  of • • •  comm uni ty l and. 114 5  In the s e  r e c ommenda tions, 
the Committee was vigorously oppo sed by local interests. One expert on 
local practi ces, Sir Brandford Griffith, noted that in opposing priva te 
owner ship and a free market in land, the government was in fact f lying 
in the face of "lo cal cust om"; as Grier comments, 
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So defini t e  and so c ommon a p r a c ti ce was  the s a l e  o f  land • • •  by 
the end of the nineteenth century that Griffith ( whose association 
with the Colony dated back to his father, Sir William Brandford 
Griffith, Governor 1 886-1 895) could say that he 'never had 
occasion to consider the que stion."46
And, as noted in an 1 895 petition f rom "chief s, natives and 'other 
inhabitant s' of the Cape Coa st, " the government's policy was unjust, 
for "now, when private enterpri se had proved the value of their lands, 
[the Government] was to deprive them of their property.1147 The
organizers of this  petition formed the first indigenous political party 
in West Africa - a party organized in large part in opposition to the 
government's r estrictions on private rights to land. 
In West Afri ca, then, we face an ironic situation in which the 
putative agency of capitalist expansion - the government of the 
colonial powe r  - actively promoted communal rights, whilst  members of 
the agrarian societies  demanded the unrestri cted right to purchase and 
to alienate land. In East Africa we face a similar ' reversal." 
Speaking in opposition to the penetration of private marke t  forces into 
the rural sect or, for example, wa s the post-war governor of Kenya, Sir 
Philip Mit chell.  Mitchel l argued that soi l degradation, environmental 
spoilage, and avaricious exploitation of land inevitably followed the 
creation of private property. What was needed, then, was "the proper 
control of the community. Each Native Land Unit, or a por tion of a 
uni t, was to be regarded as an 'estate of the community' ; each occupier 
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o f  l a n d  w a s  t o  be a 'tenant o f  the t r i b e'. 114 9  
T h e  government o f  Kenya w a s  oppo sed i n  its  !and policy by the 
indigenous people, and in par t icular,  by the Kikuyu. As long ago a s  
1 91 2  a Kenya D i strict Off icer had investigated local tenurial practice s  
a n  h a d  found that land w a s  held b y  families who occupied i t  
uncondit ionally,  that is, not at the pleasure o f  any higher authority. 
He had al so found that many of the s e  fam i ly e states had been pur chased. 
Land was  in fact bought and sold  both w ithin and between tribe s.49 It 
i s  therefore unsurprising that the Kikuyu opposed government pol icy and 
demande d individual regi stration o f  land hol dings and the enfor cement 
of private rights  to land. The urgency w ith which they pres se d  their 
demands was of course intens ified by the insecurity they felt in the 
face of the uncompensated seizure of lands by the colonial i s t s. 
Characteristic of the transition arguments of the orthodox 
model s of  agrarian change i s  the a ssumption that rural dwellers are 
assau lted by capitalism. The communal attributes of these societies 
are counterpoised against the force s of capital i sm that promote private 
interest s. Allowance is made for some members of rural society to 
demand pr ivate property righ t s : rural elite s ,  for example, would seek 
a r egime of private property righ t s  in order to defend their e conom ic 
privileges. But it could never be the case under these theories that 
agent s of capitalism would seek communal righ t s  while the members of 
agrarian socie ty seek private ones. And yet, as we have seen, there 
ex i s t s  in the African l iterature at least two ca ses in which th is 
occu r s .  
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I am not prepared t o  argue that i t  was everywhere the case that 
Africans advanced demands for private property, nor that the colonial 
government s always advanced the case of communal property. Yet the 
fact that th i s  pattern occu rred at a l l  serves to deflect our attention 
from the e conomist orthodoxies in thi s  field and to factors other than 
the l evel of capitalist development as a determinant of agrarian 
change. In particular, I w ou l d  argue, this discordant set of facts 
suggests tha t  governments may act in ways that differ from what one 
wou l d  expect,  given their societies' "stage of development";  that 
government s may confront an independent set of pol itical imperative s ;  
and that the imperat ives shaping pol itical action may l ead governments 
to lay in place characteristic  institut ions of agrarian society. 
Ideology : The Afri can data suggest that at least three maj or 
imperatives helped to shape the government' s role in agrarian change. 
One was  ideology. In the case of the British, there exi sted a genuine 
conviction that pre- capita l ist soc ieties were communitarian; that 
We stern man, in the personage of the imperialist, was introdu cing 
force s that promoted self- interested behavior ; and that because 
indigenou s institutions were scarce and inherently valuable, they 
shou l d  th erefore be protected by government. As noted by Sorrenson in 
his  discu s s ion of Norman Humphrey, an influential f igure in the post­
war devel opment of Kenyan land pol icy : 
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Humphrey - and indeed a good many other officials - doubted the 
moral right of Europeans to impose • • •  a syst em [of econom ic 
individual i sm] on Afr icans, thus destroying the s upposed communal 
sp irit of tribal tradit ion. Humphrey want e d  t o  e stabl ish a ser ies 
of  locationa l ,  divisional,  and district councils t o  manage land 
along communal l ines • • •  and he hoped thi s w oul d l ead to a re-
awakening of [the individual's] sense of duty to his fellow s  and 
his land and the inst i l l ing of of a de sire to abandon tho se false 
values that have been a m ajor product of hi s sudden contact w ith 
our c ivilization. 50 
In registering these sent iment s ,  Humphrey was,  of course,  echoing the 
sentiment s  of far more p owerful f igures in the B r it i sh colonial regim e :  
Lugard, Cameron, Perham and Hailey, t o  ment ion but a few.5 1  
Empowerment :  More imp ortant than the i deological motivations 
of government ,  however, were strategic calcul at ions m ade in the course 
of securing politi cal dom ination in Africa. The colonial government s 
sought, and needed ,  p o l it i cal allies through whom to se cure control 
over Africa's largely a grarian pop ulation. A k ey reason for insi sting 
on communal land right s ,  it woul d appear , was that a syst em s of 
communal r ight s emp owered local ly ba sed confe derates : it gave control 
over the al location of the key resources in an a grarian economy to 
those who would govern the agrarian population on behalf of the 
colonial ist powers - the tribal chief s. 
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I n  the British case, the pol icy of governing through 
"traditional rulers" was known as "indirect rule." C. K. Meek clearly 
articulates the link between indirect rule and the formation of 
property right s ;  as he state s  at the beginning of his semi-official 
treat ise,  Land Law and Custom in the Colonies : 
The authority of chiefs,  sub-chiefs and heads of clans and 
fam il ie s  is bound up with the land. The grant, therefore,  to 
indiv idual s  of absolute rights of ownership w oul d tend to disrupt 
the nat ive policy, and so, t oo, would the indi scriminate sale of 
triba l  lands by chief s. The control of al ienation of land has in 
consequence been one of the main p lank s  of the Briti sh system of 
'Indirect Rul e'.52 
So compel l ing i s  this the sis that Meek r eturns to it toward the end of 
hi s w ork ,  contending that "there is a political danger in a l low ing 
individual s  to become owners of 'freeholds' without owing any 
allegiance to the local Native Authorities."53 "If 'indirect rule' is 
to cont inue to be a car dinal principal of British policy," he 
conclude s ,  then "it would appear to be es sential that the local Native 
Authorities should r emain the ultimate 'owners' of as much land a s  
p o s s ib l e  • •  11 54 
The best system, from Meek' s point of view, was one in which 
pol iti cal loyalty to an agent of the colonial power served a s  a 
prerequisite for acce ss to land. Tignor, among other s,  exam ine d the 
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operat ion o f  this sys t em and found i t  t o  oper a t e  roughly as o n e  would 
expe c t .  Fr iends and r e l a t ives of the chief s ecured land ; indee d ,  the 
chie f ly f amilies  became t he r i che s t  land owner s  in t he d i s t r i c t s  
s t ud ie d  by T ignor . P o l i t ical enem i e s  o f  t he c h i e f s  l o s t  r ight s  t o  
land . A n d  a s  adjud icators o f  land case s ,  chie f s  became r ich: " they 
were among the f ir s t  to bu i l d  European- s t y l e  home s .  They had l arge 
property in land , w ives and s t o ck - all trad i t iona l s igns of wea l t h ,  
much o f  which was acquired through i l legal u s e s  of the ir power . 115 5  And 
even more intere s t in g ,  T ignor found that the more va luabl e  t he control 
over l and - i . e .  the scarcer the l and in re lat ion t o  the popu l a t ion -
t he grea t e r  the power which the B r i t ish pol icy of customary land r ight s  
conferred t o  t h e  c h ie f s . The Ibo and K ikuyu c h ie f s , for examp l e ,  who 
r u l e d  in densely popu lated agr icul tural areas , proved far more 
e f f ec t ive as "modern i z ing agent s "  of the Brit ish than d id t he c h i e f s  o f  
t h e  Kamba or Ma sai , who l ived i n  areas where populat ion wa s f a r  l e s s  
dense and land therefore r e l a t iv e ly more abundant . 
Counter-factual observa t ions - one s in wh ich rural dwe l l e r s  
f avor pr ivate property r ight s whi l e  capital i s t  governments favor 
corrnnunal proper t y  - ha s thus dr iven u s  to depart from orthodox t he o r i e s  
o f  rura l change . W e  have moved ins t ead t o  an approach i n  wh ich key 
rural ins t it u t ions - in this ca s e ,  prope r t y  law - are interpreted as 
po lit ical outcome s .  I n  the case a t  hand , the adopt ion o f  common 
property repre sents an effort to augment the power of the 
admini s trat ive agents of the s t a t e , and thereby se cure its more certain 
dominat ion of an agrar ian pop u l a t ion . 
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As a corol lary t o  this approach , we should expe c t  that the 
ins t i t u t ions which were adopted in any particular s i tua t ion would 
r e pr e s ent the out come of pol i t i c a l  bargaining . Viewed from this light, 
there i s  no par t icular reason t o  expec t  one or another form o f  agrar ian 
ins t i t u t ion to emerge as a consequence of soc ial change . The out come 
woul d  depend on the conf igurat ion of power .  
This inference i s  support e d  by the African ma t e r ial s .  In some 
are a s  in Afr ica both the colon ial powers and the na t ive ch ief s were 
no tab ly weak . Th is was true in Z amb ia,  where the occupy ing forces were 
sma l l and chie f ly power s had been based largely upon warfare and s lave 
r a i d ing , bo th of which were abandoned fol lowing the imperial 
occupa t io n .  It was a l s o  true in places l ike Kenya ; not only were t h e  
Br i t i s h  sma l l  i n  number bu t a l s o  acephalous societ ies w e r e  the r u l e  and 
the ins t i tut ion of chief tancy none xistent . From the po int of view of 
the colonial adminis trat ion , the result  in bo th places was a need for 
power . In the case of Keny a ,  the response was the v irtual creat ion of 
chiefs and tribal author it ies by the B r i t ish and the a s s ignment to 
the s e  native author i t ie s  o f  the power to regulate the a l loca t ion of 
"na t iv e "  land s . In the case of Z ambia,  the British f or bade any 
r e g i s t er ing of indiv idual t i t l e s  of land ownersh ip and created triba l  
r ight s in land , with land allocation be coming the r e s pons ibil ity of the 
chie f s . As G luckman state s , "the government pol icy wa s v irtua l ly the 
promo t io n  o f  t r ibal ism : ' tr ibal i sm' [is] a whole system of p o l i t ical 
and dome s t i c  r e lations . Government po l icy has supported the c h ief s 
• • •  [M]ember ship of the t r ibe and al legiance to the chief g ive a man 
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a right in l a n d  • • • •  l a n d  is h e l d  in [th i s] s y st em thr o ug h  
subordinate polit i ca l  group s ,  and ultimately through a p lace i n  kinship 
r elations.11 56 
Wher e there was a need to create r ural power, then, the 
colonial state promoted the creation of communal property r ight s a s  
part o f  its effort to e laborate sy stem s o f  rural polit i cal control over 
an agrarian populat ion. Where the colonial authority possessed 
decis ive power and was not rel iant upon the creation of rural e l ites,  
then of cour se the s it uation was different. In e s sence, the situation 
was  no longer p urely politica l ;  commer cial cons iderations coul d be 
de cis ive. Where a labor for ce was needed, for examp le,  the agrarian 
society could be "proletarianized", as in som e regions of Southern 
Africa. Or, where food crop s or export crop s were needed, the rural 
population could be left in p lace a s  a free peasantry and agrarian 
society l eft to run as a col lection of small hol der, w orking virtual ly 
w ithin a regime of private property. 
In other regions, however, rural e l ites  did exi st ;  and the 
out come of the bargaining between the colonial p ower and the indigenous 
agrarian soc iety refl ected their composition and preference s. In some 
cases, such as in Ghana, indigenous commer cial e l ites profited from the 
use of land. Export s of rubber, timber , and palm oil had long 
f lourished in the territory, and the political l eader s  were them selves 
deeply involved in commer ce and trade. In se cur ing the term s of the 
p oliti cal settl ement by which to govern the territory, then, the 
colonial power ha d p erforce to concede the right s of these rural elites 
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t o  exercise uninhibited control over their property. In Uganda, by 
contrast , the rural el ite was not commer cial ized; land was  not 
exploite d  to secure pecuniary profit s  from agriculture. Rather, the 
el ite was almost purely polit ical and cons i sted of the chiefs and their 
admini strators. In se curing allies w ithin the rural sector, then, the 
imperial i st s  had, perfor ce, to accommodate to this structure of power. 
The result was  yet another form of property settl ement : the virtual 
"Junkeri zation" of landed relations. In ret urn for their col laboration 
with the British occupying p owers,  the chiefs were given freehold 
rights on the best lands in Uganda and the peasant s  virt ua l ly rendered 
serfs. Ca sh crop production was then begun with the chiefs reaping 
vast econom ic benef it s  through the appropriation of labor dues and 
other "feudal" ser v i c e s. 5 7  
It i s  wrong, then, t o  argue that African indigenous societies 
embodied col lective property right s and that it wa s the influence of 
the West that led t o  the formation o f  private rights in land. In some 
ca ses,  rather, the agent s  of the West sought to create communal right s 
and member s of the indigenous community struggled for l egal recognition 
of pr ivate property. In any case, the form of property l aw adopted was 
shaped by the desire of the colonial state f or political domination of 
an agrarian population and by the nature of the political 
accommodations it had t o  make in or der t o  se cure it s hegem ony. 
Without attempting to overstate the case, it may be useful to 
note that in other places and in other eras rural land law was recast 
as part of a p olitical strategy of empowering sub-elites in an effort 
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t o  buil d structures o f  pol itical dominat ion. I r efer t o  Marx and 
E ngel s' discuss ion of the emergence of feudal ism among the Frank s. 
Their analysis is pol itical,  not e conom i st ;  it places at it s center the 
attempt s by the crown to organize capabi l ities for warfare and it s 
eff ort s to secure a reliable network of subor dinate s  and allies. As 
Engel s  clearly argues in his w ork , the te chnique adopted by the crown 
was one of rural empowerment : the divestiture to political allies  of 
cont r ol over land r ight s and the creation thereby of subordinates  w ith 
the capacity to dominate and govern an agrarian population and t o  
extract needed resources from them.SS 
F inances :  States are thus driven by the nee d  for dom ination 
and they develop land right s in efforts to create rural centers of 
p ow er. Their behavior i s  a l so inf luence d by the nee d  for f inances. 
The African materials clearly show the s ignif icance of financial 
imperatives in shap ing government s' pol icies toward rural property ; and 
they do so once again in a way that cast s susp icion on any belief in 
the unil inear development of agrarian inst itut ions - in part i cular, 
land right s  - in the face of cap itali sm. One of the best illustrations 
of the inf luence of fiscal cons iderations comes from Zambia. 
As is well known, Zambia depends on the production of copper. 
F i r st located early in the twent ieth cent ury , the copper deposits of 
Zambia gave birth to one of the world's l eading copper industries ; by 
1 93 0, the mine s of Zambia employed 30,000 peop le. By far the largest 
industry in thi s small territ ory, and by a vast measure the mo st 
profitable, the copper industry constituted the major element in the 
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government's tax base. 
As copper price s  rose , both the government and the mining 
companies prospered. As copper prices fell,  both suffered. But the 
cost s  imposed by lower prices were borne unequal ly; for while both the 
government and the firms experienced decreasing r evenues,  the effort s  
o f  the f irm s to lower their costs in the face o f  decl ining revenue s 
imposed increased costs upon the government. 
The mines were cap ital i st enterprise s. In the face of lower 
product prices, they maxim ized their prof it s  (or, equivalently, 
m inim ized their losses) by curtailing their use of the variable fact or 
of production: labor. While it was cost minimizing on the part of 
companies to release labor at times of lower prices,  unempl oyed labor 
threatened to add to the cost s of government. These costs coul d tak e 
the form of the state provision of food and shelter ; or they could take 
the form of higher cost s of police protection in the face of threat s 
posed by masses of unempl oyed. While both the government and the 
mining companies der ive d their r evenues from mining, then, the 
government's need for revenues increased just when these revenues 
became most scarce. 
This fiscal dilemma was,  in a sense , created by cap ital ism. 
The state did not own the means of production; the se were in private 
hands and production de cisions were made sol ely with a view to their 
privat e, a s  oppo sed to social, con sequences. Moreover, the state's 
r evenue s were subject to cycl ical shocks originating from the 
cap ital ist economies. As stated by it s Chief Se cretary at the t ime of 
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the most cataclysm ic of such shocks - the depre s s ion of the 1 930s - the 
dil emma was clear : 
The wea l th of the country is in the m inerals  which it doe s  not own 
• • • an d dir e c t  r evenue fr om this s o ur c e  i s  a t  pr e s en t 
n e g l ig i b l e  • • • •  The fact  • • •  that the  comp an i e s  ar e n o t  
earning taxable profits does n o t  dim in i sh the services which the 
Government is compel led to supply to the m in ing areas.5 9
In fact, a s  w e  have seen, the result wa s l ik e ly t o  b e  the opposite ; a t  
times o f  shor tfal l s  in revenues,  the deman d for services in creased. In 
the fact of this dilemma, the state advocated an ironic solution : the 
development of communal form s of rights t o  l anded property. 
The government created a chara cter i s t i c  form of cit izen ship : 
one in w hich rights wer e  cons trained not on ly by national mem bership 
but al so by m ember ship in a subnational ity, a "tribe." And it made 
access to land a fun ction of social and political affil iation. Lan d 
could be acquired in a rural community by aff ilia t in g  w i th its 
p o l itical officia l s  and by establishing mem bership in a kin group which 
belonged to that poli tical community.60 To re tain rural land r ight s,
then, urban dwel ler s  had t o  r emain "tribal ized. 1161  The government
promoted both poli tical an d famil ial form s of aff iliation. Urban 
authorities i s sue d  do cumen t s  es tablishing the tr iba l  pol itical 
affiliat ion of the urban labor force ; f or some p urpo ses,  such a s  the 
trying of court cases ,  they also extended the political authority of 
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rural governmen ts into the urban area s .62 An d the government
facil itated a s  well the maintenan ce of social ties w ith rural kin by 
re strictin g  the length of urban labor contracts and by helpin g  to pay 
the cos t s  of  tran sport back to the rural areas.6 3  In the se and other
way s ,  the s tate sought to re tar d  the "detribal ization" of the Afri can 
labor force. 
The r easons for thi s  behavior were clear : at tim e s  of fiscal 
stress ,  the governmen t wanted to be able to avoid the cos t s  of large­
scale unempl oyment.64 It wanted the disbanded urban labor force to be 
able to quick ly an d peacefully rein corporate itself into the rural 
economy. The cost s of guaranteeing s ubsistence were thus to be borne 
by the rural commun ity. 
In a society whose econom ic f or tunes  wer e  now tied to the most 
fluctuating of capitalist enterprise s ,  the copper industry, the 
government sought to insure that the r isks to subsistence wer e  borne by 
the rural community. And it did so by promoting communal entitlements 
to r ight s  in land. The origin s  of communal land rights thus lay at 
l east as much in cap ital i sm and in the f i s cal problems it created for 
the state a s  they di d in the inherent cul tural properties of the rural 
pop ulation . 65
Another Ins t itution : The V i llage 
Thus far I have employed the Afri can data to crit i cise several 
major components of the curren t ly orthodox theories of agrarian change : 
their statement of in itial condition s ,  their specification of 
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char a c t er i s t i c  traj e c t or ie s  of change , and their ana lys i s  o f  one ke y 
agrar ian inst itut ion : that of pr operty r igh t s .  
The African exper ience provokes a skeptical reappr a i s a l  o f  
argumen t s  pertaining t o  a second major rur a l  inst itut ion : t h e  v i l l age . 
As not e d  a bov e ,  the fate of this ins t i t u t io n  is central to both 
theor i e s .  The prevalence of v i l lage dwe l l ing i s  t aken to i l lustrate 
the importance of values  o ther than tho s e  s t r e s se d  by capit a l i s t  
so c ie t ie s : social  a f f i l ia t ion , s t a tu s , and commun ity member s h ip ,  for 
examp l e .  V il lage institutions are held to prevent explo ita t ion and to 
prov ide a pre-ca p i t a l i s t  d e f ense against  the marke t ' s  thre a t  to 
s u bs i s t ence . Mor e over , they are h e l d  t o  promo te equa l it y .  S o  central 
are v i l l ages to the orthodox concep t ion of agrarian change that the 
fate o f  rura l societies  are often por t r ayed in terms o f  the pat t erns of 
change e xhibited by vil lage commun i t ie s . 6 6  
The African ma terial c a s t s  doubt upon the s e  argume nt s .  In 
Afr i ca , vil lage dwe l l ing s imply wa s o f t e n  not the ba s i c  form o f  rur a l  
s e t t l ement . Where rur a l  pr e f erence s  c o u l d  be acted u p o n ,  persons o f t en 
pre f erred to l ive in i s o lated home s t eads . Where v i l lage were formed , 
it was often at the behe s t  of s ta t e s . Moreove r ,  many of the se s t a t e s  
were profoundly capita l ist . 6 7  
With the establ i shment of the "Pax Br itannica" i n  north-east ern 
Z amb ia , for examp l e ,  mo st soc ie t ie s  were characterized by r e s idence in 
family home s teads . In the late nineteenth centur y ,  however , the 
B r i t i sh South African Company [ B . S . A . C . ]  -- the crea t ion of tha t  mo s t  
dedicated proponent o f  cap i t a l i s t  e xpans ion , Cecil John Rhodes --
41 
d e t e rmined that the region' s rur a l  populat ion proper ly be longed in 
v i l lage s .  As noted by Kay , "throughout the who le of north-e a s t ern 
Z ambia ruthl e s s  regrouping for admin i s trative convenienc e wa s 
s y s t emat ical ly carried out . 116 8  And a s  Kay quo tes from the B . S . A . C . ' s  
own r e c or d s , "many • • •  r e s i s t e d  and were sent t o  prison b e f ore the 
order was f ina l ly obey e d .  116 9  In this area , then , v i l lage-dw e l l ing was 
not the f orm of res idence pre f erred by rural Africans . Ra ther,  it was 
the a dministrators who sought to form v i l lage s .  That the proponents of 
v il la g ization were the agents of one of the mo st ded icated embod iments 
o f  c a p i t a l ism adds a d i squie t ing note to our reappra i s a l  of the 
o r thodox po s i t ion . 70 
Even today it woul d  appear that states prefer v i l lage dwe l l ing 
to a greater degree than do rur a l  peop le . A no table case in point is 
Tanzan i a .  It was not the need to col lect taxes that l e d  t o  
v il la g iza t io n  in Tanzania.  Nor wa s i t  the need to a f f irm l aw and order 
among a recently conquered and therefore restless  popu lation.  Rather , 
the d e s ire on the part of state o f f ic ia l s  to provide pub l i c  service s 
and thereby "trans form" Tanzan ia ' s  rural society appears to have l e d  to 
a conv i c t ion that the tendency t oward dispersed set t l ement mu s t  be 
overborn and the peop l e  concentra ted into v i l lages . In the name of 
" d ev e l o pment , 11 the government of Tanzania sought to group rural 
dwe l l e r s  into groups large enough that the government could provide 
d i s pensar ies , c l inic s ,  schoo l s ,  water supplies , agricultural  input s ,  
marke t ing f a c i l itie s ,  and other service s ,  and s o  secure an unleashing 
of the produ c t ive f orces of Tanzania ' s  agrarian society . 7 1  It is 
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notable tha t the s t a t e l e g i t imated i t s  re construc t io n  of rural s o c i e t y  
b y  propounding a theory o f  Afr ican agrarian h i story in which 
' 'colonia l i sm [ had ) 'encouraged ind ividua l i s t ic s o c ia l  a t t itude s , "7 2
whereas pr ior to c o lonial i sm ,  Afr i cans h a d  l iv e d  cooperat ively i n  
s o c ia l ly int e gra t e d ,  mutua l ly support iv e ,  "v i l lage coUDilunit i e s . "  
Tanzanian scho lars have not hes itated t o  cr i t i c i z e  the val idity of 
the s e  c laims . 73
In eva luat ing the presumpt ion of v i l l age- l iv ing a s  the na tur a l  
f orm of agrarian set t l ement , then , t h e  African l i t erature encourages us 
toward caut ion . In some area s ,  vil lages appear not to have been the 
pre f erred mode o f  habitat ion . In o ther c a se s ,  where they were 
preferre d ,  they wer e  p r e f erred by s t at e s . As in the case o f  Tanzani a ,  
s ome o f  these s t a t e s  were s o c i a l i s t ; a s  in the c a s e  o f  the l a t e  B r i t i sh 
South Afr i ca Company , however , some were rampant ly c a p i ta l i s t .  
W e  can look out s ide Africa and to o ther c a s e s .  Impor t ant among 
the se is pre- indus t r i a l  Europe . There , once a ga i n ,  we f ind a l arge 
variety of "anc ient " f orms of set t l ement ; the v i l lage s imp ly wa s not a 
preferred mode of s e t t l ement . Moreover ,  when s e t t l ement took the form 
of v il lage dwe l l ing , " the exer c i se or ma int e nance of author ity over 
land and peasant seems o f ten to have been impor tant in the creat ion of 
compa ct s e t t l ement . " 74 People  were grouped the more eas ily to be
administ er e d .  The need for domina t ion thus prov ide s one reason for the 
concentra tion of pop u l a t i on .  
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Moreove r ,  v il lages were some t imes created to fac i l i t a t e  the 
extract ion of manpower and taxe s .  This cons iderat ion i s  perhaps best 
i l l u s trated in Rus s i a ,  where the f i s c a l  needs of the centr a l  
administrat ion , l inked with its l ack o f  administra t ive capab il ities , 
made the e s t a b l i shment of col l e c t ive l ia b i l ity a u seful means of 
col l e c t ing taxe s .  Rural jur i sdict ions were a s s igned ' 'fiscal  quota s "  
and h e l d  col le c t ive ly l iable f or them ; i t  wa s l e f t  u p  t o  these 
j ur i sd i c t ions to organize their own c o l le c t ion procedure s .  A common 
r e s pons e was the forma t io n  of corporat e  ins t i t u t ions which a s s umed the 
co l le c t ive l ia b i l ity and a ttached communa l  r ights to key resource s ,  
such a s  land , a s  a means o f  fac i l i ta t ing the extra c t ion o f  r e s ourc e s .  
The extreme f orm o f  this r esponse was the format ion o f  the 
repar t i t ional CODDilune . 
As d iscus sed by B lum , "the l and-equa l i z ing commune was not of 
anc ient origin . "7 5  Rather ,  it appears to have ari sen in r e s ponse to 
the need for pay ing of the so le tax,  f irst introduced in the e ighteenth 
century . As B lum ind i cat e s : 
f is c a l  cons idera t ions pl ayed a l arge part in i t s  intr oduct ion and 
spread . The stat e wanted to make s ure tha t the ind iv idual peasant 
had enough land to meet the obligat ions i t  demanded of h im. The 
pea sant , f or h i s  part , was equa l ly interested in get t ing enough 
land to pay h i s  taxes and obrok and support his famil y .  In 
addition,  • tho s e  in high p la c e s  perhap s  feared tha t the 
dis content o f  those • • •  peasants who had l it t l e  or no land, if 
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a l lowed t o  go unappe a se d ,  might break out into v io l enc e . 7 6  
T h e  r e s u l t  w a s  t h e  crea t ion o f  t h e  repa r t i t ional commune . I t  is wor th 
quo t ing B l um a t  grea t e r  l ength o n  this ma t ter : 
The serf owners , saddled with the r e s pons ib il i t y  for co l le c t ing 
t he t a x ,  r e a l ized tha t  i t  wa s in their own inte r e s t  to s e e  to it 
that each of their peasant s had the e conomic capa c i t y  to pay the 
l e vy .  
The method many propr ietors adopt e d  t o  reach the goa l was 
the u s e  of a new kind of a s s e s sment unit tha t bore an o l d  name , 
the t iaglo • • • •  it meant the peasant labor uni t ,  • • •  and the 
o b l ig a t ion the unit had t o  pay i t s  s e ignior . 7 7  
* * * 
Each t iaglo norma l ly had t o  pay the same amount of dues 
and service s .  But the number of a s s e s sment uni t s  var ied from one 
home s tead t o  another a ccording t o  the number o f  wor ke r s  in the 
home s t ead , or i t s  over a l l  potent ial . Thu s , the t o t a l  sum o f  
obl igat ions e a c h  home s t ea d  pa i d  var ied . In t h i s  way the amount 
the serfowner demanded of each pea s ant f amily wa s a d j u s t e d  to i t s  
c a p a c i t y  to pay . 7 8  
* * * 
This in turn l e d  to the equa l ization and r e d i s t r i bu t ion of 
ho l d ing s .  Since each t iaglo had the s ame amount t o  pay , and s ince 
i t  usua l ly derived a l l  or mo st of i t s  income from the l and , the 
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proprie tor • • •  furnish [ e d ]  each t iaglo with tha t  amount o f  land 
that wou l d  prov ide each of them with equa l quant i t ie s  o f  
produce . 7 9  
I n  t he instance of the repart i t ional commune , then, v i l lage 
dwe l l ing and common r ight s over property are j o ine d .  Ac c ord ing t o  the 
re igning orthodoxies , these are two o f  the key ins t i tut ions 
chara c t er i s t ic of pre-ca p i t a l i s t  soc ie t ies . But here we f ind that 
ra ther than be ing expr e s s iv e  of cul tur a l  preferenc e ,  they a r e  
ins t it u t ional r e s ponse s t o  t h e  imperat ives of po l i t i c a l  domina t ion and 
re source extraction. They are contr ivance s e laborated t o  so lve the 
probl em o f  p o l i t ical contro l and taxa t io n  in agrar ian s o c ie t ies . 80 
Informed by the skept ic ism engendered thus far , one may take 
one further step : a r e-read ing of the lit erature on cor pora t e d  
v i l lage s .  The locus c la s s icus is Wo l f ' s  1 9 5 7  a r t i c l e  i n  which h e  
ana lyzes t h e  cor porat e  commun i t ie s  of Me soamerica and Java . 81 In this 
ar t i c l e  we do in fac t f ind cu l tural ac counts o f  corporate v i l lage s : 
the crea t ion of r itual center s ,  l i t t l e  trad i t ions , redistr ibut ive 
commune s  and f e s t ival s , and so forth.  We a l so f ind s t r e s s  o n  
chara c t er i s t i c  values : equa l i t y ,  community , and the pre serva t ion of 
commun a l  rights in land . But what we a l so f ind is that the s e  
communi t i e s  were created a s  a c t s  o f  po l i tical  domina t ion ; a s  W o l f  
s t a t e s ,  '�istorica l l y ,  the c l osed corporate conf igurat ion i n  
Me s oamerica i s  a crea ture of t h e  Spanish Conquest 11 82 and "In J av a ,  
s imi l ar ly ,  corporate peasant commun i ty d id not take shape unt i l  a f t er 
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the coming of the Dut c h ,  when for the f ir s t  t ime the v i l lage as a 
territorial uni t  became a mor a l  organism with i t s  own government and 
i t s  own land at the d i s po s a l  of i t s  inhabi tant s . 1183
In the subsequent l it eratur e ,  as we hav e  ind ic a t e d ,  it i s  the 
cul ture of the c orpora t e  v i l lage that gets d i s cus sed ; indee d ,  the 
c u l tural corre l a t e s  o f  v i l l age s e t t l ement are promoted into caus e s , and 
the corporate v il lage is treated as an embod iment and d e f ender of pre­
capital ist value s .  Y e t , in Wo l f ' s  or ig inal treatment of this 
ins t itution , we can s e e  tha t it wa s impo sed by the s ta t e . A fur ther 
read ing of Wol f  indi c a t e s  the reasons for this impo s i t ion. One was to 
extra c t  r esour c e s  - corve e labor and taxes - f rom the rur al popula t ion 
while "avoiding the huge c o s t s of direct admini s trat ion . 1184 The
communi t ies were a s s igned c o l le c t ive l ia b i l i t y  for the supply of these 
resourc e s ; by be i ng given communal righ t s  over land , they were a l so 
g iven the resour c e s  by which to compel and to fac i l itate such l evie s .  
Another reason was the s t a te ' s  f ear o f  landl e s sne s s ;  the administration 
sought to pro t e c t  i t s e l f  against the burden of a lan d l e s s  popula t ion 
and created communal r ight s t o  land t o  prevent the se i zure o f  land by 
weal thy intere s t s .  Corpora t e  vil lage s provide a low c o s t  means of 
increas ing the revenu e s  extracted from rur a l  commun i t i e s  while 
obviat ing a s  we l l  the co s t s  t o  the f i s c  wh ich can be impo sed by a 
land l e s s peasant r y .  
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A Behav iora l Charact e r is t ic : The Preference f o r  Subs istence 
Init i a l  cond it ions , ins t i tut iona l trai t s ,  and chara c t er i s t ic 
patt erns of tran s ition : t he s e  three e l emen t s  help to def ine the 
or thodox mode l s  of agrar ian socie t y .  So too does a fourth e l ement : 
the p sycholo g i c a l  tr a i t s  of rural dwe l l ers . None of the se traits is 
more centra l to the convent ional mode l s  than the preference for 
subs i s t ence produ ction . 
In the natural economy mode l ,  the preference for subs i s t ence 
s tands as a coro l lary to the mode l ' s  ini t ia l  cond i t ions : the lack of 
market s  and thus the absence o f  exchange . And it prov ides a 
mot iv a t ional underpinning to the chara c t er i s t i c  response to the 
pene t r a t ion o f  market f orce s :  the initial r e s i stance to 
commo d i t iza t ion and to "buying and s e l l ing . "  I n  the model of the 
peasant economy , peasants are he ld t o  par t i c ipate in marke t s  by 
neces s i t y ,  not pr eference ; they do so ma in ly because it is the only way 
to se cure subs i s t ence . Indeed,  the preference for subs istence mode s of 
l iving s tands a s  a "pre-capit a l i s t "  art ifact - one tha t  he lps t o  
account f or t h e  t ens ion between the peasantry and o ther c l a s s e s  i n  the 
tran s i tion to capital i sm. 
It i s  Hyden who perhaps be st captures the f l avor o f  the s e  
arguments : 
The argument is • • • that • • • where the peasant mode is very 
much a l ive , there i s  an economy o ther than the market economy. 
Mo r eover , t h i s  e conomy of a f f e c t ion is being mainta ined and 
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d e f ended agains t the intru s ions o f  t h e  market economy , The 
r e s i s tance of the Afr ican peasant e conomies to capita l ism • 
s t il l  a phenomenon not to be ignored . 85 
With r e s pe c t  to Afr ica , Hyden conc l ud e s : 
So common is this s itua t ion • • •  that it is not an exaggerat ion 
to c l a im tha t the principal s truc tur a l  con s tr a int to development 
are the barriers raised • by the peasant mode of pro du c t ion 
is 
• [ P o l icy makers mu s t ]  get the pea sant inv o lved in the c a sh 
nexu s  • • • •  In order to appropr iate the surplus product f rom the 
pea sant more e f fe c t ive ly there i s  no o ther way ava ilable but to 
raise peasant produc t iv ity and make h im produce more that for h i s  
own dome s t i c  need s . 86 
Hyden and o thers thus pos it the e xi s t ence o f  a pre-cap i t a l is t  
agrarian s o c iety character ized by a pre f erence f or s u b s i s tence wh ich in 
turn frustrates  the growth of cap i ta l i sm .  The correct argument , I 
wou ld argue , in f a c t  runs in the oppo s ite d irec t ion . On the ba s i s  of 
African mater i a l s , I woul d  argue that the operat ion of market forces 
induces sub s i s tence produ c t ion on the part o f  peasant s ; that a key 
reason for this i s  that the state is empl oyed t o  cont r o l  the marke t to 
expropr iate r e sour c e s  from rur a l  populat ions ; and tha t in the f a c e  of 
such adverse market cond i t i ons , peasant s are of cour s e  reluctant to 
" buy and to s e l l . "  What i s  taken a s  a "pre-cap it a l i s t "  form o f  
4 9  
behavi or ,  then , i s  in fact endogenou s to the conf igura t ion o f  
c a p i ta l i s t  f or c e s  a s  present ly struc tured in the develop ing a r ea s .  
The mo s t  dire ct il lus tra t io n  o f  these argument s  can b e  taken 
from the export marke t s  of Afr ica . Many export crops are "cash crops , "  
pure and s impl e ;  they have no d irect use in consumption and are grown 
pure ly for the marke t .  Recent ly the volume of agr i cultur a l  exports 
from Africa ha s de c l ine d ,  crea t ing shortages of for eign exchange ; this 
d e c l ine ha s been taken by Hyden and o ther s as ev idence of the 
d i srupt ive power of a pre-capi t a l i s t  pea s antry . But , I would argue , i t  
should be v iewed i n  a d if f erent l ight . 
In Africa , over 80 per cent of the population and over 50 
percent of the gross  dome s t i c  product commonly res ide in agr icultur e .  
The governmen t s  are there f or e  r e l iant o n  the industry for f inanc ial 
resour c e s . One way in wh ich government s tax agr icultur e  i s  by 
regula t ing the marke t for export crops . In many ca se s , the government 
is the so l e  l egal buyer of these crops . It pur chases  them at an 
admin i s trat ive ly set price in the dome s t i c  market and s e l l s  them at 
pr i c e s  prevail ing in the wor ld marke t ,  The go�ernment accumu l a t e s  
revenue generated b y  the d i f ference be tween the domes t ic a n d  world 
market pr ice s .  Table 1 present s the ratio of the dome s t i c  and wor ld 
price s ,  a d j u s t e d  for the co s t s  of transpo r t ,  market ing and pro c es s in g .  
I n  mo s t  c a se s ,  it sugge s t s ,  produce r s  of c a s h  crops are heav ily taxed . 
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Table 1 :  Nominal Protection Coeffi cient s  for Selected Export Crop s 
Crop 1 97 1-7 5 1 97 6-80 
Cocoa 
Cameroon . 3 7  .45 
Ghana . 47 . 40 
Ivory Coa st . 56 . 38 
Togo . so . 2 5  
Coffee 
Cameroon (Arabica ) . 7 2  . 6 0  
Cameroon ( Robusta ) . 3 6  
Ivory Coast . 68 . 3 6  
Kenya . 94 
Tanzania . so . 5 9  
Togo . 42 • 23 
Cotton 
Cameroon • 7 9  
Ivory Coast . 7 9  1 . 0 5  
Kenya 1 . 07 
Malawi . 68 • 7 5  
Mal i  . 5 5  .44 
Senegal . 6 5  
Sudan • 78 . 6 0  
Togo . 6 2  .7 9 
Upper Volta • 7 9  
Source : IBR D, Ac celerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda 
f or Act ion , Washington D. C . : IBRD, 1981 , p . 56 .  
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One implication of government f i s cal policy i s  that the returns 
to participating in the market p lace are lowered for many farmers. In 
any ca se,  they certainly ar e lowered by compar i son with the returns to 
producing crop s  which can be consumed on the farm or so ld out s ide of 
off icial marketing channels. This phenomenon i s  illustrated in table 
2 ,  which compares the net return of f ive major export crops in Uganda 
(cotton, robusta coffee, t ea,  cocoa, and tobacco) with the net return 
to f ive commodities f or w hi ch government control s di d not exist (maize, 
m il let , beans, groundnut s ,  and p lantains). 
The government' s use of market controls t o  l evy resources from 
agriculture thus l owers the returns t o  farmers from production for the 
market , both in absolute and relative terms. This in and of it self 
would a ccount for the pea sant's turning away from cash crop production • 
But the analysis can run even deeper. For the manipulation of 
agricultural market s ,  I would argue, not only reduces the returns to 
farming but also places farmers under the economic and pol iti cal 
control of persons with political influence. 
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Table 2 :  Compara t ive Net Returns o f  Maj or Crops i n  1 97 5  and 1 97 7 / 78a 
( Shil l ings per kil ogram , estimat e )  
1 97 5 1 97 7 / 78 
1 .  Seed Cotton -1 . 37 -3 . 40 
2 .  Robusta  Cof fee -0 . 38 +0 . 7 4  
3 .  Tea (green leaf) -0 . 16 -0 . 3 1  
4 .  Cocoa -0 . 2 5  -0 . 1 0  
5 .  Fir e-cure d Tobacco . . . . .  -1 2 . 20 
6 .  Mai z e  +0 .68 +2 .07 
7 .  Finger Millet +l . 36 +5 . 08 
8 .  Beans +1 . 90 +5 . O S  
9 .  Groundnut s . . . . .  +5 . 64 
1 0 .  Plantains +1 . 03 +l . 90 
a .  Net returns equal s  average price l e s s  average cost s .  
Source : M inistry of Agr icul tur e & Forestry, '�ricing Pol icy & 
Agricultural Production: Discussion Paper," (Entebbe : Mini stry of 
Agricul ture & Forestry , Augus t  1 978) . 
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The best w ay to illustrate these argum ent s is to return to the 
m arket f or export crops. Governm ent s are not only intere sted  in 
securing public revenues from this m arke t ;  they are also intere sted in 
securing foreign exchange. Tow ard this end they overvalue their 
currencies ( see table 3). The effect of overvalua t ion i s  
s traigh tforw ard. By maintaining a n  artificia l ly strong currency , 
governm ent s l ower the perceived price of foreign products.  The policy 
is therefore popular w ith industrialists,  who seek cheap imports of 
plant and capital equipment ; elites, who seek m ore cheaply t o  ful f il l  
their ta stes for im ported product s; and governm ent s them selves, who are 
starved for f oreign currencies w ith which to purchas e  vehicles,  off ice 
equipm ent , capital goods and other form s of im port s. 
But the price of a policy of overvaluation i s  the l ow ering ( in 
term s of dom e stic currency) of the earnings generated in f oreign 
m ar kets by export s. For eign dollars convert into f ew er units of 
dom estic currency, for the value of the dom estic currency has been 
set at  an art ificially high l evel. The se effect s are s um m arized in 
diagram 1 .  
* 
p 
p 
Po 
= 
lf,Oj $ 
p l = 1/, 1/ $ 
Q s 1 
s 
Diagram 1 :  Overvaluation 
D 
Q s o  = Q ll o  QD 1 
Fo re ign Currency 
54 
Table 3 :  Estimat es of the Ov ervaluation of African Currencie s , 1 97 9  
Cameroons 1 . 00 
Ghana 3 .00 
Ivory Coast 1 . 1 0  
Kenya 1 . 40 
Malawi 1 . 0 5  
Mal i  1 . 1 0  
N igeria 1 . 40 
Senegal 1 . 40 
Sudan 1 . 3 0  
Tanzania 1 . 50 
Togo 1 . 1 0  
Upper Volta 1 . 1 0  
Zambia 1 . 5 0  
Source : Doris J. Jan sen, "Agricultural Pri cing Pol icy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1 97 0 s , "  December ,  1 980 , and Franz Pi ck, Pick's Currency 
Yearbook, 1976-1977 , (New York : Pick Publishing Corporat ion , 1 978) . 
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The horizontal axi s indicates the quantity o f  foreign goods, here 
indexed in t erms of dollars ( $ ) ,  demande d or supplied; the vertical 
axis repre sent s  their price in term s of dome stic currency, here called  
cedis (¢). The supply curve is the marginal cost curve of the export 
industry ; it shows the amount of exports (or dol lars) which will  be 
suppl ied f or any given valuation of the l ocal currency. The demand 
curve represent s  the demand for imports (or foreign dollars),  g iv en 
their perceived  price in terms of ce dis. Overvaluing the cedi ( from ¢0 
to t 1) l owers the cedi price of the dollar (from P0 to P1).  The res ult 
is to cheapen import s. But the correlative effect is to weaken the 
incentives to export , so  that the supply of export s decline s from QS 
0 
to Qs • 
1 
The w ithdrawal from cash crop markets is thus an expect e d  
res ult o f  the efforts b y  states to manipulate prices i n  market s - in 
thi s  case, currency markets - so as to se cure public resour ce s for the 
fisc. But al so important is that overvaluat ion p laces farmers in a 
posit ion of economic and polit ical bondage. 
To gain insight int o  thi s effect,  we may return to Diagram 1 .  
At the overvalued price o f  the dome st i c  currency (P1 ) ,  the quantity of 
foreign exchange demanded (QD ) is greater than the quantity s upplied 
1 
(QS ) ;  there is thus an excess demand for foreign exchange at the 
1 
off icial price for it ( i.e. at the official exchange rate). One result 
of this induced scarcity is to drive up the market value of foreign 
exchange ;  those who can get it can sel l it at a price that lies 
signif icantly above the off icial price. As can be seen in diagram 1 ,  
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w ith Qs s upplied at the off icial exchange rate, the m arket clearing 
1 
price w oul d in fact be p* ( i.e. ,  where dem and equa l s  supply). Another 
result i s  that at the official exchange rate demand can only equal 
supply through rationing ; f ixing the pri ce at P1 maintains a condition 
of excess demand (QD > Q5 ) and tho s e  in control of allocating foreign 
1 1 
exchange can chose those who will  - and who w i l l  not - get a chance t o  
im port foreign goods. 
The consequences are obvious. Tho se in charge of the f oreign 
exchange "m arket " stand to reap enormous r ewards from it. If they can 
secur e foreign exchange at price P1 , they can resel l it at p
*; 
alt ernat ively, if they can import for eign goods at the art ificial ly 
l ow ered price of P1 , they can resell  them at the m ar ket cl earing pr ice 
of p*. Moreover, the benefi ciaries of this system are tho se in 
pol it i cal control. For w ith fixe d prices in the f irst instance , this 
"market " is in fa ct not a m arket at al l ;  the initial allocation of 
s carce resources takes place through adm inistrative and pol it i cal 
channels ,  and only in the se cond instance - when the benef it s of the 
s carcity are reaped in black m arkets - through the e stabl ishm ent of 
com petit ive prices. 
In this system , the beneficiaries are those in the Central B ank 
or tho se who m a ke appointments to it. They are those  who s it on the 
f oreign exchange allocation com m ittees and the com m ittees which 
allo cate im port l i censes, or tho se who m ake the appointm ent s to the s e  
comm ittees. They are those who receive im port l icense s ,  or who 
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allocate them. The loser s  in this system are those who are not located 
in po s itions of access to this scarce resource and who nonetheless must 
purcha s e  im ported goods. 
Typica l ly there are no peasant farm ers in the Central Bank or 
on the comm ittee that allocate s  for eign exchange or im port l i censes. 
Yet the farm er s rely on import s. Hoe s,  cutlasses,  sprayers,  
pe sticide s ,  ox ploughs and im plem ent s ,  sack and bags, m il l ing machine s ,  
and so forth : these farm im plem ent s are often im ported. Moreover, 
shirt s,  shoe s ,  blanket s ,  soap, batteries,  etc. : these consum er goods 
are often im ported or are m anufactured w ith im ported equipm ent. But 
given the s carcity of foreign exchange, the value of im port s i s  
extrem ely high (p* i n  diagr am 1 )  these im port s w ill only be provided i f  
they can command a t  l east that val ue. The consequence i s  that the 
farm er s m ust pay a prem ium to those who have suf f icient po l itical power 
to secure pr ivileged access to for eign exchange or to the im port s it 
can buy. 
Overvaluat ion thus weakens the incent ives to operate in 
m arkets. It lowers the price of export s,  increases cost s of farm ing 
and rai ses consumer prices for farmers. And it does so while invol ving 
the farmer s  in a system of r egulated foreign exchange m arket s :  one in 
which they are subject to po l itical and econom ic dom inat ion by persons 
w ith influence in the nat ional capital. 
Conventional orthodoxies def ine the pea santry in term s of 
political subor dination and a pr eference for subsistence. In dynam ic 
term s the peasantry is def ine d in term s of their rever sion to 
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subsi s tence ; th i s  i s  seen a s  a pre-ca p it a l i s t  r e s i stance to the s pread 
of the market economy . My argument i s  that these characterist ics can 
b e t t er be expl a ined in t e rms of a model o f  r evenue extr a c t ion . 
The preference f or subs i s t ence need not be attr ibuted to pre­
cap i t a l i s t  values ; rather,  i t  i s  a preference tha t any pers o n ,  and 
e s p e c ia l ly any capita l is t , wou l d  e xpr e s s  under highly d isadvantageous 
market condi t ions . The powe r l e s s ne s s of peasants nee d  not be 
introduc ed a s  a separate d e f ining trait ; a long with the preference for 
subsistenc e ,  it c an be ac counte d  for as the j o int consequence of the 
way in which market s  have been manipulated to extract r e sour c e s  f rom 
agricul t ure . Nor nee d  the w i thdrawal to subs i s t ence be seen a s  
exogenous ly d e t ermined ,  e . g .  as a result o f  pre-ca p i ta l is t  force s ; 
ra ther it shoul d  be seen a s  endogenous - a f orm of behavior total ly 
accountable in t erms of the s y s t ems of r e l a t ions that d e f ine the 
contemporary po l i t ic a l  e conomy o f  third wor l d  agrar ian popula t ions . 
P o l i t i c a l  power l e s sne s s ,  a preference for subs i s t ence , and 
tendency to wi thdraw from mar ke t s  and to keep them at a rm' s l ength : 
these charact e r i s t ics are u s e d  to def ine peasant s ,  They appear , 
however,  to be integr a l  f e a t ures of a pro c e s s  whereby states  employ 
marke ts to extract r e sour ces from agr i cu l tur e .  In this  sense , s t a t e s  
can b e  s a i d  to c r e a t e  pea s ant s . 87 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper I have at tempted to summarize two of the dominant 
mod e l s  of agrar ian change . And I have sought to crit ique them in l ight 
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o f  my knowledge o f  rur a l  Afr ica . The s e  approaches require f or their 
truth initial conditions which historica l ly have rarely exi s t e d .  They 
are over ly s ubj e c t ivi s t ,  attribut ing ins titut ions to preferences under 
c ircumstance s in which these inst i tut ions have c learly been impo sed . 
And they are over ly e conomi s t ,  in that they place too s trong an 
empha s i s  on the impac t  of the market on agrarian s o c ie t ies and too 
l it t l e  o n  the impa c t  of stat e s . Time and aga in throughout th i s  e s say, 
an approach has proved fruitful that relates the chara c t er i s t ics of 
rural s o c i e t i e s  t o  the r equirements of the state . Wha t is c a l led f or ,  
then , i s  a n  approach t o  the exp l ana t ion o f  rural inst itut ions that is 
s ta t e  c entered -- one tha t looks a t  the e f fe c t  upon rur al s o c i e ty of 
the demand for power and resources on the part of states  under 
condi t ions in which peopl e  and wealth are concentrated in agr iculture.  
60 6 1  
NOTES 
1 .  By capital ism i s  meant a n  econom ic syst em in w hich there exist s (1)  
market exchange of  both produ ct s and factors of  produ ction; ( 2) in 
particu l ar ,  private market s for l abor ; and (3) econom ic 
accumulation, thu s securing the reprodu ct ion and expansion of the 
means of produ ct ion. 
2 .  S e e ,  for example, Karl Polany i ,  The Great Transformat ion ( Boston : 
Beacon Pre s s ,  1 957)  and Karl Marx and Fre der ik Engels, Pre­
Capitalist Socio-Economic Format ion s :  A Collect ion ( London:  
Lawrence and Wi shart , 1 97 9 ) .  
3 .  Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Society (New York:  Harper 
Torchbooks , 1 963) and Henry Maine, Ancient Law (London : Lardon J. 
Murray , 1 96 1 ) .  
4. George Dalton, ed. Tribal and Peasant Economies (Garden City, New 
York: Natural Hist ory Pre ss,  1 96 7 ) ;  Eric R. Wol f, Peasant Wars of 
the Tw entieth Century (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1 96 9) ; Joel S. 
M ig da l ,  Peasant s ,  Po l itics and Revolut ion ( Princeton: Princeton 
Univer s ity Pre s s ,  1 97 4 ) ;  James C. S cott, The Moral Economy of the 
Peasant (New Haven and London: Yal e  Univer s ity Press,  1 97 6) ;  Samuel 
L. Popkin, The Rat ional Peasant (Berkeley and Lo s Angeles : 
Univer s ity of Cal ifornia Pre s s ,  1 97 9 ) , 
5. George Dalton, '�raditional Pro du ction in Primitive African 
Econom ies" in Tr ibal and Peasant Economic s ,  ed. George Dalton 
( Garden City, New York : Natural History Pre s s ,  1 967 ) , p. 7 5 .  
6 .  George Dalton, "Sub s i stence and Peasant Econom ies i n  Africa , "  in 
Ib i d ,  p .  1 57 .  
7 .  Karl Marx, 11Precapital i st Economic Formations , "  in Karl Marx and 
Fre derick Engels, Pre-Capitalist Socio-Economic Format ions , p. 97 . 
8 .  Ib i d ,  p. 9 8 .  
9 .  Ib id,  p.  1 06 .  
1 0. James c. Scott, "Prote st and Profanation: Agrarian Revolt and the 
Little  Tradition, " Theory and Society 4097 7 ) ,  p .  2 1 3 .  
6 2  
1 1 .  E r i c  Wo l f ,  "Closed Corporate Pea sant Commun i t ie s  in Mes oame r i c a  
a n d  Central Java , " Southwes t ern Journa l o f  Anthropo logy 1 3 ( 1 95 7 ) , 
p .  6 .  
1 2 .  A pr ime i l lustrat ion woul d  be Joe l S .  Migda l ,  Peasant s ,  Po l i t i c s ,  
and Revolut ions . 
1 3 . Dal ton , quo t ing Raymond Firth in "Subs i s t ence and Peasant 
E conomi c s , "  p .  1 5 9 .  
1 4 .  Scott , The Mora l Economy o f  the Peasant , p .  5 .  
1 5 .  Robert Redf i e l d ,  Peasant Soc iety and Cul ture ( Ch i cago : Univer s i t y  
o f  Chicago Pre s s ,  1 956 ) ,  p .  46 . 
1 6 .  Wo l f ,  Peasant War s , p . 27 9 .  
1 7 . I b i d ,  p . 2 80 .  
1 8 .  I b i d ,  p . 2 82 . 
1 9 .  Scott , "Prot e s t  and Profana t i on , " p . 23 1 . 
2 0 , Ibid . 
6 3  
2 1 . Goran Hyden ,  E f f i c iency vs D i s t r ibut ion in East African Co­
opera t ive s ( Na i rob i : East African L i t erature Bur eau , 1 97 3 ) ,  p .  4 .  
2 2 .  S e e  the d i s cus s ions in W i l l iam Derman , Serfs , Peasants and 
Soc ia l i s t s  ( Berke le y  and Los Ange les : Univer s it y  of Cal i fornia 
Pres s ,  1 97 3 ) ;  Dean E.  McHenry , Tanzan i a ' s  Ujanea V i l lages 
( Berke ley : Ins t itute of Internat ional S tud ie s ,  Univers ity o f  
C a l ifornia , 1 97 9 ) ; S .  A .  Qu ick,  "Bureaucracy and Rur a l  Soc i a l ism in 
Zambia , "  Journa l o f  Modern African Studies 1 5 0 97 7 ) : 3 7 9-400 ; and 
Dona l Cru i s e  O ' Br ien , The Mourides of Senega l ( Oxford : C la r endon 
Pre s s , 1 97 1 ) .  
2 3 . As quo t ed by L .  A .  Fa l lers in "Are Afr i can Cul t ivators to b e  Cal led 
'Peasant s ' ? "  in Economic Deve lopment and Soc ial Change , ed . George 
Dal ton ( Garden City : The Na tural History Pre s s , 1 97 1 ) ,  p . 1 7 0 . 
24 . Redf i e l d , Peas ant Soc iety and Culture . 
2 5 . Teodor Shanin,  "Introduc t ion , " in Peasants and Peasant Soc iety,  e d . 
Teodor Shan in ( Harmondsworth : Pengu in Books , 1 97 1 ) ,  p .  1 50 .  
2 6 . C laude We l c h ,  "Peasant s a s  a Focus in African Studies , "  African 
Studies Rev iew 2 0 ( 1 97 7 ) , p . 5 .  
64 
27. Eric R. Wolf, ''Types of La tin American Pea santry : A Prel iminary 
Discus sion , " American Anthropologist 57 ( 1 95 5 ) ,  p .  454. 
28.  Fal l er s ,  "Are African Cult ivators • • •  , " p.  17 1 .  
29.  A. V. Chayanov, The Theory of Peasant Economy, ed. Daniel Thorner, 
Basile Kerblay, and R. E. F. Sm i th (Homewood, I l l inoi s :  Richard D. 
Irwin for the American Economic Association, 1 966) . 
30 . Wol f ,  Peasant War s ,  p .  xiv . 
3 1 .  Quotation from Guy Routh, "More s  and Mot ivations of Peasant and 
Proletarian Households in Tanzania," (University of East Africa 
S ocial Science Conference , Dar es Salaam, December 1 97 0) by Goran 
Hyden, ''The Re s il ience of the Peasant Mode of Production : The Ca se 
of Tanzania," in Agricultural Development in Afr ica : Issue s  of 
Pub l ic Policy ed. Robert H. Bates and Michael F. Lofchie (New York: 
Praege r ,  1 980 ) , pp. 2 24-2 2 5 .  
3 2 .  Ken Post, "Peasant ization and Rural Pol itical Movements i n  We stern 
Af rica , "  Archives Eurofieenes de Sociologie 1 3 ( 1 97 2 ) , pp. 2 26-227 . 
33 . Ibid, p. 233 , 
6 5  
34. Goran Hyden, Beyond U jamaa in Tanzania (Berkeley and Los Angeles : 
Univer sity of Cal ifornia Pre s s ,  1 9 80 ) , p. 3 1 .  
35,  Gavin W il l iam s ,  "The W orl d Bank and the Peasant Problem," in .fu!lll 
Development in Tropical Africa, ed. Judith Heyer, Pepe Roberts,  and 
Gavin Wil l iams ( New York : S t .  Mar tin' s Pre s s ,  1 9 81 ) ,  p .  3 1 .  
36 . Migdal , Peasants ,  Polit ics , and Reyolution ; Wol f ,  Peasant Wars .  
37.  Jack Goody, "E conomy and Feudalism in Africa," The Economic His tory 
Review 23( December 1 96 9 ) , pp. 3 94-395 . 
3 8 .  Ibid, p .  3 95 . 
3 9. Pol ly Hil l ,  Studies in Rural Capitalism in West Africa (Cambridge : 
Cambridge Univer sity Pre s s ,  1 970)  and Sara Berry, Cocoa, Custom and 
Socio-economic Change in Rural Western Nigeria (Oxford: Oxford 
Univers ity Pre s s , 1 97 5 ) . 
40. Jan S. Hogendorn, "Econom ic Initiative and African Cash Farming," 
pp.  2 83-328 in Colonialism in Africa, 1870 - 1 960, ed. Peter 
Duignan and L. H. Gann (Cambr idge : Cambridge Univers ity Pre ss ,  
1 97 5 ) .  
66 
41. Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides of Senegal and G. K. Helleiner Peasant 
Agriculture. Government, and Economic Growth in N igeria (Homewood, 
Ill. : Richard D. Irwin , 1 96 6 ) .  
4 2 .  Giovanni Arrighi,  ·�abor Suppl ies i n  H istorica l  Perspect ive : A 
Study of Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhode sia, 1 1  
in Giovanni Arrighi and John S. Saul , Essays on the Political 
Economy of Africa (Nairobi : East African Publi shing House, 1 97 3 ) ,  
p .  1 85 .  
43 . Ibid. 
44. See also the cas e s  de s cribed in Robin Palmer and Nei l Par sons, e ds. 
The Roots of Rural Poyerty in Central and Southern Africa (Berkeley 
and Los Ange l e s : University of Cal ifornia Pre s s ,  1 97 7 ) .  
45. Beverly Grier, "Underdevelopment, Mode s of Production, and the 
State in Co lonial Ghana , 11 The African Studies Review 24( 1 981) ,  p. 
3 5 .  
46 . Ibid, p. 33 , 
47. Dav id Kimble, A Polit ical History of Ghana (Oxfor d:  Clavendon 
Press , 1 96 3 ) , p .  345 . 
67 
48. Quoted in M, P. K. Sorrenson, Land Reform in Kikuyu Country 
( Nairobi : Oxford Univer sity Pre s s ,  1 967 ) , p . 6 6 , 
49 . Ibid,  p .  20 - 21 . 
SO . Sorrenson, Land Reform, p . 5 8 .  
5 1 .  See, for example, Lord Hailey, An African Suryey: Revised, 1 95 6  
(London : Oxford Univers ity Pre s s ,  1 957 ) ;  Frederick D .  Lugar d, � 
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa ( London: F. Cas s ,  1 96 5 ) ;  
and Margery Freda Perham, Natiye Administrat ion in N igeria (London : 
Oxford University Pre s s ,  1 937 ) .  
52. C. K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies (London : Oxford 
Univer s ity Pre s s ,  1 949) , p. 1 0 .  
53 . Ibid, p .  1 93 .  
54.  Ibid. 
55.  Robert L. Tignor, "Colonial Chiefs in Chief less Societies,"  Journal 
of Modern African Studies 9(1 97 1 ) ,  p. 3 50. See also M. Clough, 
Chiefs and Polit icians : Local Politics and Social Change in Kiambu, 
Kenya , 1 91 8  - 1 936 , PhD Di sserta t ion, Stanford University,  1 97 8 .  
6 8  
56 . Max Gluckman,  "For eword "  t o  W .  Wa t son , Tr iba l Cohe s ion i n  a Money 
E c o nomy ( Manche s ter : Manche s t e r  Univers ity Pre s s  for the Rhode s ­
L iv ings tone Ins t i t u t e , 1 95 8 ) , p p .  x - x i .  
5 7 . Wes t ,  Land P o l icy in Buganda . 
5 8 .  Freder i ck Enge l s ,  "The Frank i s h  P e r io d "  in Kar l Marx and Frederick 
Enge l s , Pre-Cap it a l is t  Soc io- e conomic Forma t ions . H i s tor ians wou l d  
no longer agree perhaps w i t h  t h e  p ic t ur e  of "emerg ing f e ud a l i sm" 
u po n  which Marx and Eng e l s  b a s e d  their analys is . Wha t would b e  in 
doubt woul d  be the Frank ish c rown ' s  a b i l ity to contro l the 
s p l inter ing of po l i t i c a l  power . (g. See Marc B l o c h ,  Feudal 
Soc iety, trans . L.  A.  Manyo n ,  London 1 96 1 , chap . XXVII , esp.  pp . 
3 6 1 - 8 )  But of med iev a l  awa r e ne s s  of the connec t ion b e tween l and 
law and p o l i t ical domina t ion t here can be no doubt .  Professor S .  
F .  C .  M i l som i n  The Legal Framework o f  Engl ish Feuda l ism 
demonstrates  land l aw as e s s e n t ia l  in the pro c e s s  by which the 
Eng l i sh crown a t  the he ight o f  its power increased its contro l at 
the expense of pr ivate cour t s ,  .!!!_ the pr ice of a l lowing the feudal 
magnat e s  to ma inta in and ind e e d  increase the ir contro l over the 
peasant r y , by refus ing owne r s h i p  of peasant l and to any but h i s  
lord . ( S .  F .  C .  M i l s om ,  The Lega l Framework of Eng l i s h  Feud a l ism,  
Cambr idge , 1 97 6 ,  esp.  chap . 1 ( 'D i s c ip l inary Jur i sd ic t ion ' , and 2 
' Propr ietary Idea s ' . )  I w i s h  to thank E l eanor Sear l e  for the s e  
po int s  and c itat ions . 
6 9  
5 9 .  L .  H .  Gann , A H i s tory of �orthern Rhodes ia ,  ( London : Cha t to and 
Windus , 1 964 ) , p .  2 5 3 . 
60 . Watson , Tr iba l Cohe s ion ; a l so J .  van Ve l se n ,  "Labour : !i::;rat ion as a 
Po s i t ive Factor in the Cor: t inu ity of Tonga Triba l S o c ie t y , "  in 
S o c i a l  Change in Modern Afr ica , e d .  Aiden Southa l l  ( London : Oxford 
U n ive r s i t y  P r e s s , 1 96 1 ) .  
6 1 . Exc e l l ent d is cu s s ions are inc luded in E lena L .  Berge r ,  Labour , Race 
and Co lonia l Ru l e : The Copperbelt from 1 924 to Ind ependence 
( Ox f or d : C l arendon Pre s s ,  1 97 4 )  and Cha r l e s  Perrings , Black 
M ineworkers in Central Afr ica ( Hew York : Afr icana Pu b l i s hing 
Company 1 97 9 ) . 
6 2 .  The b e s t  d i scuss ion rema ins A .  L .  Eps tein,  P o l i t ics  in an Urban 
A f r ican Community ( Manche s ter : �'.anche ster U n iver s i t y  Pre s s  for t he 
Rhode s-Living s t one Ins t i tute , 1 9 5 8 ) . 
6 3 . S e e  Perring s ,  Black l l ineworkers . See a l so He lmuth Be i s l e r ,  
Urban i za t ion and the Government of Migrat ion ( New Yor k :  S t .  
Ma r t in ' s  Pre s s , 1 9 74 ) .  
70 
64 . Mo s t  obvious l y ,  the s e  costs are the c o s t s  of provid ing subs i s t en c e  
and t he c o s t s  o f  po l i c ing an unrul y  urban mob ,  I nsofar as 
unemp loyment i s  a s s oc iated w i th land l e s s ne s s ,  however , a third c o s t  
is imp l ied : t he c o s t  of administer ing an "unatta ched" popu la t ion. 
People w i thout property lack c l a ims t o  r e sour c e s  med ia t ed by a 
legal s y s t em ,  P ropertylessne s s  therefore imp l i e s  freedom f rom 
admin i s tra t ion and , from the s t a t e s '  po int o f  v iew, freedom from 
cont ro l ,  Peop l e  w ithout prope r t y  po s e  a threat to pub l ic 
admin i s trat ion . In Africa , t herefore , the s t a t e s  c learly f avored 
the retent ion o f  r ight s  to land . This was apparen t l y  true a s  we l l  
in �ng land . For Marx c l early argues tha t  t he "king and parl iament " 
re s is ted enc l o s ur e , and d id so for many of the reasons we have j u s t  
d i s cu s s e d  ( Ka r l  Marx , "The So-Cal led P r imit ive Accumula t ion , " Part 
VII I ,  Capit a l  ( New Yor k :  Cha r l e s  H .  Kerr and Co . ,  1 906 ) , pp . 
7 8 9 f f ) ; a s  Marx s ta te s , " l e g i s lat ion wa s terr i f ied at this 
revo lut ion" ( Ibid . ,  p.  7 90 ) . 
6 5 .  For add it iona l argument s  see Cl aude Me i l las soux , Maiden s ,  Mea l  and 
Money : Cap i t a l ism and the Dome s t ic Community ( Cambr idge : Cambr idge 
Univer s it y  P r e s s , 1 981 ) ;  Haro ld Wo lpe , "Cap i t a l ism and Cheap Labour 
Power in South Africa , "  Economy and Soc i e t y ,  1 ,  no . 4 ( 1 97 2 ) :  4 2 5 -
456 ; and R o b i n  Pa lmer and Ne i l  Parsons , eds . ,  Roo t s  o f  Rura l  
Poverty in Central and Southern Africa ( Berkeley and Los Ang e le s : 
Univer s ity of C a l ifornia Pre s s ,  1 97 8 ) . Where I d i f fer f rom the s e  
approache s i s  in my sens i t ivity t o  t h e  d ivergence of int ere s ts 
7 1  
be tween t h e  s t ate and p r ivate ent erprises  and i n  my c onvi c t ion 
that the s tate was set upon s o lv ing i t s  own f is c a l  p r o b l em by 
contro l l ing the format ion of land laws . P r ivat e ent e r p r i s e s  
na tura l ly cared less  about t h e  problem than d i d  the s ta t e ; and , 
when they d id care , they o f t en had po l ic y  pre ference s  a t  var iance 
with tho s e  of the state ' s  admin i s trator s .  
6 6 .  S e e , f or examp l e , Joe l S .  Migdal , Peasant s ,  Pol i t i c s  and 
Revo lut ions . 
6 7 . The arguments in this sect ion echo those f irst advance d  in Samuel 
L. Popk in ,  The Rat ional Peasant ( Berke ley and Los Ang e l e s : 
Unive r s it y  of Cal ifornia Pre s s , 1 97 9 ) . In this , and o ther ma t t er s ,  
Popkin ' s  work is bril l iant ly prophe t ic . 
6 8 .  George Kay , Soc ia l Aspe c t s  o f  V i l lage Regrouping in Zambia ( Lusaka : 
Ins t itute for Soc ial Resear c h ,  Univers ity of Zamb ia , 1 96 7 ) ,  p .  1 1 . 
6 9 .  Ibid , p .  1 0 .  
70 . Note a l s o  the Kenya case , where Sorrenson notes : "The K i kuyu did 
not l iv e  in vil lages , but in d i s persed hou seholds . 
• Dur ing the 
Mau Mau Emergency the Kikuyu , the Embu and some of the Meru 
popu l a t ion wer e concentrated in 732 v i l lages • •  
Re form , p .  3 .  
" S o r r enson,  Land 
7 2  
7 1 . The best studies are Micha e l a  Von Freyho l d ,  U j amaa V i l l ages in 
Tanzania ( New York and London : Monthly Rev iew Pre s s , 1 97 9 ) ; Dean E .  
McHenry ,  Jr . ,  Tanzan ia' s U j amaa V i l l ages ( Berke ley : Inst itute of 
Int ernat ional Studies , 1 97 9 ) ; and Goran Hyden , Beyond U jamaa in 
Tanzania ( Berke ley and Lo s Ang e l e s : Univers ity of C a l ifornia Pre s s , 
1 980 ) .  
7 2 .  Hyden ,  Beyond U ja maa , p .  9 8 .  
7 3 . See , for exampl e , Samu e l  S .  Mu s h i ,  "Modern iza t io n  by 
Tra d i t iona l izat ion : U j amaa Pr inc iples  Rev is ited , "  Taamu l i  1 ,  no . 2 
( March 1 97 1 ) .  
7 4 .  C .  T .  Smith , A H i s t o r i c a l  Geography o f  We s t ern Europe Be fore 1 800 
( London : Longmans , 1 96 7 ) ,  p . 26 1 .  See a l s o  J. G. Hurs t ,  '�he 
Changing Medieval V i l lage in Eng l and , "  in Pathways to Med ieva l 
Peasant s ,  ed ited by J .  A .  Raf t i s , Papers in Med ieva l Studies  2 
( Toronto : Pont if ical Ins t itute of Medieval Stud ies , 1 981 ) ,  pp . 2 7 -
6 2 . 
7 5 .  J erome B lum , Lord and Peasant in Rus s ia ( P r inceton : P r inceton 
U n iversity Pr e s s , 1 96 1 ) , p .  5 1 0 . 
7 6 . Ibid , p .  5 1 4 .  
7 3  
7 7 .  Ibid , P •  5 1 2 . 
7 8 .  Ibid , p .  5 1 3 . 
7 9 .  I b id , p .  5 1 4 .  
80 . I t  i s  re levant to note that i n  severa l societies i n  Africa , sta t e s , 
in order to secure repayment of agricul tura l inv e s tment s ,  have made 
v i l lage u n i t s  co l l ec t iv e ly l iable for debt s ; defaul t s  by any farmer 
in these v il lage s is s u f f ic ient to d i squa l ify a l l  farmers in tha t 
v i l lage for future loans . Moreover,  in many parts of Africa , 
agricultural goods , once harve sted by farmers , are automa t ic a l l y  
t h e  proper t y  of the s t a t e ; t h e y  cannot be bought a n d  s o l d  i n  the 
marke t . The reason i s  that the harve s t  stands a s  co l latera l . The 
s ta t e  has d e f ined proper t y  rights over the harve s t  in such a way as 
t o  f a c i l i t a t e  the movement of capital into the rur a l  area s . Once 
again,  the n ,  we f ind corporate ins t itut ions and c o l lect iv e  rights 
b e ing created by stat e s . That in these cases the s t a t e s  are 
e xp l ic i t l y  operat ing s o  a s  to promote the movement - and recovery -
of capital only adds to the force of our crit ique of the dominant 
theor ies o f  t he orig ins of agrarian inst itut ions . 
81 . Eric R .  Wo l f ,  "Closed Corporate Peasant Commun i t i e s  in Mesoamer ica 
and C entra l Java , "  Southwe s t ern Journa l o f  Anthropo logy, 1 3 0 95 7 ) : 
1 - 1 8 .  
74 
82 . Ibid , p .  7 .  
83 . Ibid , p .  8 .  Wo l f  is quot ing J .  S .  Furniva l l ,  Nether lands Ind ia : A 
S tudy of P lura l Economy ( Cambr idg e : C ambr idge Univ er s i t y  Pre s s , 
1 93 9 ) . 
84 . Wol f ,  "Closed Corporated Peasant Commun i t ie s , "  p .  1 0 .  
85 . Hyd en ,  Beyond U j amaa ,  p .  1 9 .  
86 . Ibid , p .  3 1 . 
86 . Coquer y-Vidrov itch,  in wr i t ing about pre-co lonial Afr ican 
s o c ie t ie s , def ined the African mode of produc t ion as one in 
which s t a t e s  d id not d irec t ly contro l producers ( e . g .  through 
enserfment o f  s lavery ) but ra ther contro l led and manipu l a t ed 
trade to accumulate resources f rom t hem . Her ana l y s i s  is a t  
l e a s t  a s  app licab l e ,  i n  my v iew , t o  contemporary Africa a s  it 
was t o  the pre-co lonial period , and very l ike l y  more s o . See 
C a t he r in e  Coquery-Vidrovi t c h ,  "Rec herches sur un mod e  de produ c t ion 
Afr i c a in , "  La Pensee 144( 1 96 9 ) : 61-7 8 .  
